BOOM: What, other than explosive, can you call Joan Conrow’s report today on our very own Kaua`i Beer Summit, with four- count ‘em four- deputy county attorneys, cold pack in hand, showing up at Councilperson Dickie Chang’s home to put the thumb screws on him to vote for the vacation rentals bill tomorrow.
According to Conrow
Upon hearing reports that Deputy County Attorney Mike Dahelig had called Councilman Dickie Chang at home one evening and asked if he wanted to have a beer, then showed up with a cold pack, followed thereafter by the separate arrivals of Deputy County Attorney Ian Jung and County Attorney Al Castillo and a discussion of the pending transient vacation rental bill, in which Dickie reportedly was told it was his duty to pass the measure because otherwise the county would be sued, I called Mike late yesterday afternoon and asked if it was typical for county attorneys to meet with Councilmembers at their homes and have conversations about bills before the Council.
But Joan didn’t leave it there and if that wasn’t disturbing- and potentially illegal and certainly of questionable ethics- enough she called Dahelig and he had some outrageous and memorable things to say about the clandestine confab outside of the council chambers where the council’s consultations with attorneys are supposed to take place.
“You are not the first person to make that inquiry of our office today,” Mike said. “What we did was not illegal. We’re the attorneys for all the Council members. And it’s like any other attorney and client. If they wish to talk with us, we are not going to dictate the venue they choose; we are not going to discern where the locale is. Our office does not engage in direct lobbying, but if there are legal concerns, we will discuss those matters with them.”
“But I heard that you called Dickie,” I said. “He didn’t call you.”
“We may even ask to sit down with Council members if we feel there is some confusion about the issue raised about them on the [Council] floor,” Mike said. “We’re going to advise and counsel, but never take any type of action to tell them how to vote. If we feel that there is some issues being raised that are not on point, we will raise issues with them. We do not go and say actually you have to vote a certain way.
Well that certainly is a strange interpretation of their job, especially considering that it’s been a rule of the council that the county attorney’s office does not represent individual councilpersons but the council as a whole- a rule used in order to squelch individual councilmembers' ability to divulge county attorney opinions without the approval of the whole body among other things.
We’ve talked to councilmembers who were denied access to county attorney advice and told to bring it up in executive session where the whole council could share in the answer.
But Conrow’s report wasn’t without a little hilarity. She asked Dahelig
“What about the beer?” I asked. “Is that just a guy thing, or what’s up with that?”
“Beer is not a substance that we’re not allowed to engage in,” Mike said. “In terms of what beverages we’re drinking, that’s not our job to be in a position to describe the circumstances of the meeting. As far as alcohol consumption, I can’t find anywhere that says it’s illegal.”
Somehow the tortured language of the reply reminds us of the famous Churchill quote saying “that is something up with which I shall not put”.
But back to the illegality. Joan said:
“Did you talk to any other Councilmembers?” I asked
"I’m not going to answer that, and I’m not going to discuss the nature of the conversation,” he said. “That’s privileged information [under attorney-client privilege].”
Here we go again. If indeed they had done the same thing with only one other councilperson it might not violate the sunshine law. But if a total of three were similarly consulted outside the confines of a duly agendaed or otherwise legally called executive session it would apparently violate the serial consultations provisions which forbid three or more councilmembers from deliberating toward a decision and especially discussing how they would vote and forbids using others to accomplish the same banned communications.
But the use of “attorney client privilege” when it comes to the open meetings provisions of the sunshine law was the subject of the infamous ES 177 case which we’re certainly not going to rehash here except to say the county won and now the Office Of Information Practices (OIP) is reluctant to challenge the council when attorney client privilege is concerned.
It may all hit the fan- although we wouldn’t be surprised to see it be either swept under the rug on Wednesday or if it does come up taken into executive session- at tomorrow’s meeting because, in the comments section of Joan’s article, former Councilperson and current council candidate Mel Rapozo wrote:
I have submitted a written request, through Council Chair Asing, that the Council defer this matter until these allegations can be investigated by an outside agency. This is a serious matter that should not be taken lightly. The County Attorney has a duty to represent all departments of the County, and should not be "taking sides" of either the Executive or Legislative branches of government.
There are certainly other issues here especially since the council as a whole is the client, not Chang. But as we’ve said the reign of current county Attorney Al Castillo continues to be punctuated with questionable ethics and a need to influence legislation in a manner that is way outside the bounds of the “powers, duties, privileges and liabilities” of the office of the county attorney.
Showing posts with label Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Monday, December 28, 2009
CHASING THE WHITE RABBIT
CHASING THE WHITE RABBIT: It’s anyone’s guess what participants will show up at the January meeting of the Board of Ethics (BOE). Certainly Rolf Bieber won’t be sitting on the inside of the rail but more importantly, the results of the meeting may depend on which deputy county attorney shows up- Mona Clarke who showed some signs of honest lawyering in her last appearance or Mauna Kea Trask who has proved adept at wielded the kings sword of evasion and deceit.
But the one person we know will be there is Horace Stoessel whose pen-knife wielding on the subject of charter section 20.02(d) is zeroing in on a death by a thousand cuts through his bulldog tenacity at stabbing away at Trask’s and his mentor County Attorney Al Castillo’s rapiers of jabberwocky.
Here’s Sir Stoessel’s latest parry in anticipation of January’s joust. Meet ya on the other side.
THE PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER OVER THE COUNTY CODE
TO: Kaua`i County Board of Ethics
FROM: Horace Stoessel
SUBJECT: The Primacy of the Charter Over the County Code
DATE: 12/28/09
I ask that this communication be placed on the January agenda of the Board of Ethics.
I believe it is essential for the Board of Ethics to ensure that its members are in agreement about the primacy of the Charter over the County Code , and specifically the primacy of 20.02D over 3-1.7, lest the confusion and conflict of the last two years be repeated in the future.
The confusion and conflict are rooted in two unsupportable assumptions.
First, the assumption that 20.02D is applicable only to the extent allowed by the three subsections of 3-1.7. Second, the broader assumption that the County Code is equal, or even superior, in authority to the Charter and can be used to limit or disregard charter provisions.
Both assumptions contradict the basic principles that ordinances are subordinate to charter provisions and that ordinances may only supplement charter provisions, not limit or preempt them.
It will be useful to review the point at which the two assumptions came into play. Upon receiving a request for an advisory opinion from Charter Commissioner Jonathan Chun in February 2008 as to whether he could appear as a private attorney before other County agencies on behalf of his clients, the board asked the county attorney for an opinion regarding the scope of 20.02D and 3-1.7(c), (d) and (e).
Instead of answering the board’s question directly, the legal opinion first misinterpreted the question to mean “whether these provisions of the Code have the effect of modifying the language” of 20.02D (emphasis added). It then offered the following inconclusive advice: “In conclusion, it is this office’s opinion that provisions in Section 3-1.7 of the Code serve to articulate and elaborate on the intent of the Code of Ethics, and they must be read in conjunction with the Charter provisions. In other words, Section 20.02D may not be read in a vacuum.”
Since the County Code is subordinate to the Charter it would have been more accurate to conclude that 3-1.7 cannot be read in a vacuum.
To determine the scope of these provisions means to delineate their applicability. The board already knew that Chun’s actions were not prohibited by the three subsections of 3-1.7 because it had issued an advisory opinion based solely on 3-1.7 just two months earlier in a comparable case, so it was looking for an answer about the applicability of 20.02D.
The short answer to the board’s question is that the three subsections of 3-1.7 differ in scope from each other, that all of them contain limitations on their applicability, and that all are narrower in scope than 20.02D, which expresses no limitations on its applicability. Therefore, reading the provisions in conjunction with each other leads to the conclusion that 3-1.7 was inapplicable in the Chun case and that 20.02D prohibited his appearing in behalf of his clients before county agencies.
The board overlooked the fact that the county attorney had not answered its question. It obviously accepted the attorney’s unfounded claim that 3-1.7 can modify the language of 20.02D. It then made a leap from the attorney’s conclusion that it must read the provisions in conjunction with each other to its own conclusion that Chun could continue representing his clients before other agencies. The net effect was that the board reached its conclusion by reading 3-1.7 in a vacuum.
Although the County Code links 3-1.7 to Charter 20.01, not to 20.02D, there is no harm in treating the three subsections of 3-1.7 as complementary to 20.02D. Harm comes when the subsections are utilized to restrict the applicability of 20.02D, and that is what happened in the Chun case.
The cure for two years of confusion and conflict is for the board to keep clearly in mind the primacy of the Charter over the County Code .
ADDENDUM: The second opinion received by the board begins and ends with language similar to the language of the first opinion. However, it differs in arguing that a “strict construction” reading of 20.02D would lead to absurd results. It does not claim or try to prove that basing a response to Jonathan Chun’s request for an advisory opinion on 20.02D would be an absurd result.
As we reported previously, case law in no uncertain terms states that if an interpretation of a provision yields “absurd results” it is the interpretation, not the statute, that must be discarded. But nothing goes as given at the BOE where the red queen has declared “execution first, trial later” and men on the chessboard are constantly getting up and telling you where to go.
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And in case you didn’t notice, another piece of the November chessboard is in place with Mel Rapozo’s announcement that, with open offices galore and ego-addled councilmembers eager to play musical chairs in no short supply, he will be taking the politically safe road this fall by running for county council, ending speculation that his notorious reach-exceeding grasp would cause him to seek higher office again.
We are ecstatic that, in fact, we will have Mel to kick around again but even happier that, for all his foibles, we may see someone on the council willing to occasionally mention the naked emperor and we can’t wait to see him move the personnel department and bike path scandals back on the council’s front burner.
But the one person we know will be there is Horace Stoessel whose pen-knife wielding on the subject of charter section 20.02(d) is zeroing in on a death by a thousand cuts through his bulldog tenacity at stabbing away at Trask’s and his mentor County Attorney Al Castillo’s rapiers of jabberwocky.
Here’s Sir Stoessel’s latest parry in anticipation of January’s joust. Meet ya on the other side.
THE PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER OVER THE COUNTY CODE
TO: Kaua`i County Board of Ethics
FROM: Horace Stoessel
SUBJECT: The Primacy of the Charter Over the County Code
DATE: 12/28/09
I ask that this communication be placed on the January agenda of the Board of Ethics.
I believe it is essential for the Board of Ethics to ensure that its members are in agreement about the primacy of the Charter over the County Code , and specifically the primacy of 20.02D over 3-1.7, lest the confusion and conflict of the last two years be repeated in the future.
The confusion and conflict are rooted in two unsupportable assumptions.
First, the assumption that 20.02D is applicable only to the extent allowed by the three subsections of 3-1.7. Second, the broader assumption that the County Code is equal, or even superior, in authority to the Charter and can be used to limit or disregard charter provisions.
Both assumptions contradict the basic principles that ordinances are subordinate to charter provisions and that ordinances may only supplement charter provisions, not limit or preempt them.
It will be useful to review the point at which the two assumptions came into play. Upon receiving a request for an advisory opinion from Charter Commissioner Jonathan Chun in February 2008 as to whether he could appear as a private attorney before other County agencies on behalf of his clients, the board asked the county attorney for an opinion regarding the scope of 20.02D and 3-1.7(c), (d) and (e).
Instead of answering the board’s question directly, the legal opinion first misinterpreted the question to mean “whether these provisions of the Code have the effect of modifying the language” of 20.02D (emphasis added). It then offered the following inconclusive advice: “In conclusion, it is this office’s opinion that provisions in Section 3-1.7 of the Code serve to articulate and elaborate on the intent of the Code of Ethics, and they must be read in conjunction with the Charter provisions. In other words, Section 20.02D may not be read in a vacuum.”
Since the County Code is subordinate to the Charter it would have been more accurate to conclude that 3-1.7 cannot be read in a vacuum.
To determine the scope of these provisions means to delineate their applicability. The board already knew that Chun’s actions were not prohibited by the three subsections of 3-1.7 because it had issued an advisory opinion based solely on 3-1.7 just two months earlier in a comparable case, so it was looking for an answer about the applicability of 20.02D.
The short answer to the board’s question is that the three subsections of 3-1.7 differ in scope from each other, that all of them contain limitations on their applicability, and that all are narrower in scope than 20.02D, which expresses no limitations on its applicability. Therefore, reading the provisions in conjunction with each other leads to the conclusion that 3-1.7 was inapplicable in the Chun case and that 20.02D prohibited his appearing in behalf of his clients before county agencies.
The board overlooked the fact that the county attorney had not answered its question. It obviously accepted the attorney’s unfounded claim that 3-1.7 can modify the language of 20.02D. It then made a leap from the attorney’s conclusion that it must read the provisions in conjunction with each other to its own conclusion that Chun could continue representing his clients before other agencies. The net effect was that the board reached its conclusion by reading 3-1.7 in a vacuum.
Although the County Code links 3-1.7 to Charter 20.01, not to 20.02D, there is no harm in treating the three subsections of 3-1.7 as complementary to 20.02D. Harm comes when the subsections are utilized to restrict the applicability of 20.02D, and that is what happened in the Chun case.
The cure for two years of confusion and conflict is for the board to keep clearly in mind the primacy of the Charter over the County Code .
ADDENDUM: The second opinion received by the board begins and ends with language similar to the language of the first opinion. However, it differs in arguing that a “strict construction” reading of 20.02D would lead to absurd results. It does not claim or try to prove that basing a response to Jonathan Chun’s request for an advisory opinion on 20.02D would be an absurd result.
As we reported previously, case law in no uncertain terms states that if an interpretation of a provision yields “absurd results” it is the interpretation, not the statute, that must be discarded. But nothing goes as given at the BOE where the red queen has declared “execution first, trial later” and men on the chessboard are constantly getting up and telling you where to go.
---------
And in case you didn’t notice, another piece of the November chessboard is in place with Mel Rapozo’s announcement that, with open offices galore and ego-addled councilmembers eager to play musical chairs in no short supply, he will be taking the politically safe road this fall by running for county council, ending speculation that his notorious reach-exceeding grasp would cause him to seek higher office again.
We are ecstatic that, in fact, we will have Mel to kick around again but even happier that, for all his foibles, we may see someone on the council willing to occasionally mention the naked emperor and we can’t wait to see him move the personnel department and bike path scandals back on the council’s front burner.
Friday, December 18, 2009
(PNN) BIEBER TOSSED FROM ETHICS BOARD- SAYS CARVALHO. ISOBE “AFRAID AND ANGRY BECAUSE I DIDN’T DRINK THE KOOL-AID.”
BIEBER TOSSED FROM ETHICS BOARD- SAYS CARVALHO. ISOBE “AFRAID AND ANGRY BECAUSE I DIDN’T DRINK THE KOOL-AID.”
(PNN) -- They say Diogenes’ search for an honest man came up empty because there aren’t any.
Board of Ethics member Rolf Bieber found that out in spades this week. After a year of trying to bring some ethical standards to county government he was unceremoniously dumped from the Board of Ethics (BOE) by Mayor Bernard Carvalho with little or no explanation.
Bieber say that Carvalho cryptically told him via telephone that his application for a full BOE term wouldn’t be approved and when he asked why Carvalho responded with one word: “balance”
“I asked for clarification” Bieber told us in a telephone interview this morning. “Afterall, I feel like I am the balance.”
Bieber has a Monday morning appointment to get further clarification noting Carvalho also claimed “it’s not me”.
But Bieber thinks it’s pretty apparent why his service was rejected- his attempts to get others on the BOE, to enforce county charter provision 20.02(d) which prohibits county officials from appearing on behalf of private interests before county agencies, board and/or commissions- including some who have engaged in such activities
Bieber filed complaints against BOE members Mark Hubbard and Judy Lenthall who had appeared on behalf of Kauai Action and Planning Alliance and the Food Bank respectively, hat in hand, asking for money before the county council saying he felt like that was part of the job of a BOE member.
“I took an oath of office and I honored that oath. Mark and Judy were breaking the law so what was I supposed to do?” Bieber asks.
“If I have to get fired for dong my job under this administration maybe I need to run for office again next November so they can’t fire me.”
Bieber ran unsuccessfully for mayor against Carvalho in the 2008 “special” election after the death of Mayor Bryan Baptiste.
Bieber addressed the supposed “chilling effect” enforcing the charter would have on finding people to fill the volunteer slots on the many B&Cs, as cited by Board and Commissions (B&Cs) Administrator John Isobe and others.
Bieber says that “the concept that they can’t find people to fill these boards and commissions is a myth and I’m a prime example of that.
“People were aware I wanted to continue the work on the BOE. In November I had reapplied at the Boards and Commissions office for BOE and I made public statements that I was seeking a second term.
“Here we have a person who wants to serve, who has no conflicts, who’s being rejected by the administration. They’re saying they can’t find folks without conflicts of interest and I’m one who doesn’t and who wants to continue to serve and they’re rejecting me.”
One of the most controversial issues was what Bieber and fellow BOE member Paul Weil as a "fatally flawed" advisory opinion from current County Attorney Al Castillo and his Deputy Mauna Kea Trask that, despite the fact that it was "advisory" Castillo claimed was binding on the board.
The opinion would use the “Code of Ethic” ordinance to redefine 20.02(d) virtually out of existence, violating supremacy of law principles.
So why does Bieber think he was rejected, to be replaced with another county insider, former Deputy County Attorney Warren Perry who many believe to have been one of the prime behind-the-scenes movers in the firing of ex- Police Chief KC Lum- due to a BOE decision- and the installation of his brother, KPD Chief Darryl Perry, who was “runner-up” when Lum was appointed chief?
“All I can come up with is that they’re afraid and angry because I didn’t drink the Kool-aid.” he says.
Bieber does say though that he is genuinely thankful for his original appointment that came after his endorsement of Carvalho in the waning days of last years election after Bieber was eliminated in the first round.
“I appreciate the opportunity and there’s a lot of work left to be done. I want to continue it but for some reason they don’t want me to.”
As to what specifically he sees as problematic Bieber says “there’s a certain quality of openness that’s missing among many who serve on board and commissions”.
He cites an example of how, when a county worker he knows appeared before the board he felt compelled to disclose his friendship. But when BOE member Lei Fuller, who serves on the YWCA Board, heard Prosecutor Shaylene Iseri-Carvalho’s testimony before the BOE about a budget rearrangements in her department that would be a windfall for the “Y” she failed to note any conflict or even feel any need to disclose any potential or even appearance of a conflict of interest.
“That’s what I’m trying to bring to the BOE- a higher standard of ethics than we have now” he says.
“Hubbard doesn’t even believe in the concept of appearance of a conflict of interest- it’s another example of my ethical standard verses those of some of the other board members”.
Bieber did note that he thinks that, at least partially through his efforts, fellow BOE member Lenthall has apparently seen how the law applies to her and has not sought another term on the BOE so she can continue her work at the Food Bank without any ethical problems.
“I hope that if nothing else I’ve been able to raise these issues and maybe in the future appointments of those with obvious conflicts will be a thing of the past.”
(PNN) -- They say Diogenes’ search for an honest man came up empty because there aren’t any.
Board of Ethics member Rolf Bieber found that out in spades this week. After a year of trying to bring some ethical standards to county government he was unceremoniously dumped from the Board of Ethics (BOE) by Mayor Bernard Carvalho with little or no explanation.
Bieber say that Carvalho cryptically told him via telephone that his application for a full BOE term wouldn’t be approved and when he asked why Carvalho responded with one word: “balance”
“I asked for clarification” Bieber told us in a telephone interview this morning. “Afterall, I feel like I am the balance.”
Bieber has a Monday morning appointment to get further clarification noting Carvalho also claimed “it’s not me”.
But Bieber thinks it’s pretty apparent why his service was rejected- his attempts to get others on the BOE, to enforce county charter provision 20.02(d) which prohibits county officials from appearing on behalf of private interests before county agencies, board and/or commissions- including some who have engaged in such activities
Bieber filed complaints against BOE members Mark Hubbard and Judy Lenthall who had appeared on behalf of Kauai Action and Planning Alliance and the Food Bank respectively, hat in hand, asking for money before the county council saying he felt like that was part of the job of a BOE member.
“I took an oath of office and I honored that oath. Mark and Judy were breaking the law so what was I supposed to do?” Bieber asks.
“If I have to get fired for dong my job under this administration maybe I need to run for office again next November so they can’t fire me.”
Bieber ran unsuccessfully for mayor against Carvalho in the 2008 “special” election after the death of Mayor Bryan Baptiste.
Bieber addressed the supposed “chilling effect” enforcing the charter would have on finding people to fill the volunteer slots on the many B&Cs, as cited by Board and Commissions (B&Cs) Administrator John Isobe and others.
Bieber says that “the concept that they can’t find people to fill these boards and commissions is a myth and I’m a prime example of that.
“People were aware I wanted to continue the work on the BOE. In November I had reapplied at the Boards and Commissions office for BOE and I made public statements that I was seeking a second term.
“Here we have a person who wants to serve, who has no conflicts, who’s being rejected by the administration. They’re saying they can’t find folks without conflicts of interest and I’m one who doesn’t and who wants to continue to serve and they’re rejecting me.”
One of the most controversial issues was what Bieber and fellow BOE member Paul Weil as a "fatally flawed" advisory opinion from current County Attorney Al Castillo and his Deputy Mauna Kea Trask that, despite the fact that it was "advisory" Castillo claimed was binding on the board.
The opinion would use the “Code of Ethic” ordinance to redefine 20.02(d) virtually out of existence, violating supremacy of law principles.
So why does Bieber think he was rejected, to be replaced with another county insider, former Deputy County Attorney Warren Perry who many believe to have been one of the prime behind-the-scenes movers in the firing of ex- Police Chief KC Lum- due to a BOE decision- and the installation of his brother, KPD Chief Darryl Perry, who was “runner-up” when Lum was appointed chief?
“All I can come up with is that they’re afraid and angry because I didn’t drink the Kool-aid.” he says.
Bieber does say though that he is genuinely thankful for his original appointment that came after his endorsement of Carvalho in the waning days of last years election after Bieber was eliminated in the first round.
“I appreciate the opportunity and there’s a lot of work left to be done. I want to continue it but for some reason they don’t want me to.”
As to what specifically he sees as problematic Bieber says “there’s a certain quality of openness that’s missing among many who serve on board and commissions”.
He cites an example of how, when a county worker he knows appeared before the board he felt compelled to disclose his friendship. But when BOE member Lei Fuller, who serves on the YWCA Board, heard Prosecutor Shaylene Iseri-Carvalho’s testimony before the BOE about a budget rearrangements in her department that would be a windfall for the “Y” she failed to note any conflict or even feel any need to disclose any potential or even appearance of a conflict of interest.
“That’s what I’m trying to bring to the BOE- a higher standard of ethics than we have now” he says.
“Hubbard doesn’t even believe in the concept of appearance of a conflict of interest- it’s another example of my ethical standard verses those of some of the other board members”.
Bieber did note that he thinks that, at least partially through his efforts, fellow BOE member Lenthall has apparently seen how the law applies to her and has not sought another term on the BOE so she can continue her work at the Food Bank without any ethical problems.
“I hope that if nothing else I’ve been able to raise these issues and maybe in the future appointments of those with obvious conflicts will be a thing of the past.”
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
LUCKY DOG
LUCKY DOG: One advantage attorneys have over we poor mortals when looking at the “I can’t believe they just said that” Kaua`i county government machinations is that they spend most of their time with noses stuck in the archaic minutia of prior court decisions.
Through such tedium Kaua`i attorney Charley Foster has apparently found a Hawai`i Supreme Court precedent- Fasi v. City Council of City and County of Honolulu- that makes the county attorney’s opinion on charter section 20.02(D) the “lousy lawyering” asserted by Board of Ethics member Paul Weil in the letter to County Attorney Al Castillo we posted Monday.
In his post yesterday at his Planet Kaua`i blog Foster first provides an excellent brief synopsis of the "absurdities” of the “absurdity theory” in the opinion as well as the apparent rejection of the hierarchy of law doctrine saying:
Recall the recent county attorney opinion that asserted that the provision leads to results just too absurd to comply with, and must therefore be read in conjunction with more lenient county ordinances so that officers, employees, etc can in fact appear on behalf of private interests.
Leaving aside the point that an honest reading of the provision simply does not lead to absurd results, and that the ordinance in question doesn't actually apply to the controversial section, what troubles me about the County Attorney's assertion is that it appears to rest on a fundamental misapprehension of the hierarchy of law represented by charters and ordinances. It is axiomatic that a county charter is the fundamental law and that ordinances that fail to conform to charters are what in the federal context would be called "unconstitutional."
Then he drops the bombshell that should end any controversy.
However, it's one thing to assert a legal proposition, and another to back it up with legal authority. As luck would have it, the other day I ran across the case of Fasi v. City Council of City and County of Honolulu, 72 Haw. 513, 823 P.2d 742 (Haw. 1992), in which the Hawaii Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "[a] basic tenet of municipal corporation law is that an ordinance which conflicts with an express provision in a charter is invalid."
The proposition is self-evident that an ordinance must conform to, be subordinate to, not conflict with and not exceed the charter, and can no more change or limit the effect of the charter than a legislative act can modify or supersede a provision of the constitution of the state. Ordinances must not only conform with the express terms of the charter, but they must not conflict in any degree with its object or with the purposes for which the local corporation is organized.
this applies whether or not a charter provision led to "absurd results." The only remedy in such a case would be to amend the charter. It is certainly not permissible to alter a charter's clear requirements by resort to a contrary ordinance.
But one irony that Foster might have missed is that the attorney who argued and won the case for the Fasi administration was none other than then Deputy Corp. Council for Honolulu Jonathan Chun whose request for a BOE ruling on the applicability of 20.02(D) to his job of appearing on behalf of clients before the county council and whether it conflicted with his role on the charter commission, started the ball rolling on the series of events regarding the provision.
It would seem that the tight-lipped Chun should have been very familiar with this decisions but remained silent on the matter
It’s one thing to be accused of lousy lawyering. But matters of lazy lawyering are if anything worse and many times lead to incompetence and even misconduct complaints to the bar.
If Castillo and his deputy Mauna Kea Trask want to avoid such talk it might behoove them to reconsider their ill- or under-considered “opinion” as to whether any “officer or employee of the county shall appear in behalf of private interests before any county board, commission or agency” as stated in charter section 20.02(D).
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We’ll be back Monday but in the meantime check out Kaua`i activist Ann Punohu’s new blog, lengthily titled “Punohu's Politics, Environment and Culture Blog - A blog to keep interested readers up on what Anne Punohu is doing in political, environmental and cultural issues and activities. Updated frequently. If you like Hawaiian culture, political or environmental issues you will love this blog”.
Through such tedium Kaua`i attorney Charley Foster has apparently found a Hawai`i Supreme Court precedent- Fasi v. City Council of City and County of Honolulu- that makes the county attorney’s opinion on charter section 20.02(D) the “lousy lawyering” asserted by Board of Ethics member Paul Weil in the letter to County Attorney Al Castillo we posted Monday.
In his post yesterday at his Planet Kaua`i blog Foster first provides an excellent brief synopsis of the "absurdities” of the “absurdity theory” in the opinion as well as the apparent rejection of the hierarchy of law doctrine saying:
Recall the recent county attorney opinion that asserted that the provision leads to results just too absurd to comply with, and must therefore be read in conjunction with more lenient county ordinances so that officers, employees, etc can in fact appear on behalf of private interests.
Leaving aside the point that an honest reading of the provision simply does not lead to absurd results, and that the ordinance in question doesn't actually apply to the controversial section, what troubles me about the County Attorney's assertion is that it appears to rest on a fundamental misapprehension of the hierarchy of law represented by charters and ordinances. It is axiomatic that a county charter is the fundamental law and that ordinances that fail to conform to charters are what in the federal context would be called "unconstitutional."
Then he drops the bombshell that should end any controversy.
However, it's one thing to assert a legal proposition, and another to back it up with legal authority. As luck would have it, the other day I ran across the case of Fasi v. City Council of City and County of Honolulu, 72 Haw. 513, 823 P.2d 742 (Haw. 1992), in which the Hawaii Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "[a] basic tenet of municipal corporation law is that an ordinance which conflicts with an express provision in a charter is invalid."
The proposition is self-evident that an ordinance must conform to, be subordinate to, not conflict with and not exceed the charter, and can no more change or limit the effect of the charter than a legislative act can modify or supersede a provision of the constitution of the state. Ordinances must not only conform with the express terms of the charter, but they must not conflict in any degree with its object or with the purposes for which the local corporation is organized.
this applies whether or not a charter provision led to "absurd results." The only remedy in such a case would be to amend the charter. It is certainly not permissible to alter a charter's clear requirements by resort to a contrary ordinance.
But one irony that Foster might have missed is that the attorney who argued and won the case for the Fasi administration was none other than then Deputy Corp. Council for Honolulu Jonathan Chun whose request for a BOE ruling on the applicability of 20.02(D) to his job of appearing on behalf of clients before the county council and whether it conflicted with his role on the charter commission, started the ball rolling on the series of events regarding the provision.
It would seem that the tight-lipped Chun should have been very familiar with this decisions but remained silent on the matter
It’s one thing to be accused of lousy lawyering. But matters of lazy lawyering are if anything worse and many times lead to incompetence and even misconduct complaints to the bar.
If Castillo and his deputy Mauna Kea Trask want to avoid such talk it might behoove them to reconsider their ill- or under-considered “opinion” as to whether any “officer or employee of the county shall appear in behalf of private interests before any county board, commission or agency” as stated in charter section 20.02(D).
-----------
We’ll be back Monday but in the meantime check out Kaua`i activist Ann Punohu’s new blog, lengthily titled “Punohu's Politics, Environment and Culture Blog - A blog to keep interested readers up on what Anne Punohu is doing in political, environmental and cultural issues and activities. Updated frequently. If you like Hawaiian culture, political or environmental issues you will love this blog”.
Monday, November 23, 2009
(PNN) BOE’S WEIL CALLS CA’S 20.02(D) OPINION “LOUSY LAWYERING”
BOE’S WEIL CALLS CA’S 20.02(D) OPINION “LOUSY LAWYERING”: (PNN) -- In a stunningly blunt couple of letters written in mid September, Board of Ethics member, attorney Paul Weil, scathingly attacked and belittled both a county attorney opinion regarding the conflict of interest provisions of the controversial county charter section 20.02(D) and County Attorney Al Castillo’s behavior and professional abilities.
In the document- released to the public and posted at the local newspaper’s web site by reporter Michael Levine-.Weir calls the latest opinion “lousy lawyering” and states that “(n)either you nor the Board should twist the law to accommodate or solve such "problems"
Weil had previously called the opinion “fatally flawed.” The letters apparently followed a meeting between Castillo and Weil at Weil’s home.
Weil wrote to Castillo that after the meeting he expected Castillo to come to the next BOE meeting but instead Castillo sent his deputy Mauna Kea Trask.
He wrote:
I really expected that, as I had suggested, you might withdraw the (opinion) letter and make proper revisions along the lines of our discussion.
Boy, was I wrong! The same old game became apparent when your Deputy started by denying that he had spoken with you; then later stating that he had only a "brief general discussion" with you, and then proceeded to demonstrate that he was familiar with at least the major points of our extended discussion and was prepared to try to rebut! They also neglected to state that you had briefed them on how to handle the Board!
As for your statement that you were only able to "brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics", I believe that they did a very good job of following your instructions. That is, if your instructions were to stonewall; to obfuscate; to continue a program of less than subtle attacks maligning, patronizing and insulting those who had contrary views; avoiding questions and discussion; providing specious and erroneous explanations to try to justify some of the statements in the Opinion letter; playing to friendly or seemingly sympathetic members of the Board (some of whom, I believe, want only that their prior actions in the Chun matter be vindicated and the entire mess forgotten); and, by Mr. Trask, following your own example of getting out of there at the first opportunity, departing before the end of the meeting claiming that other duties prevented him from remaining to respond to further discussion or questions and dumping it on Mona!
The first letter from Weir to Castillo lays out his disappointment that Trask seemed unaware of their meeting and goes on to detail the specific problems with the opinion as well as Weir’s disappointment in Castillo’s absence from the BOE meeting.
But rather than address Weir’s specific questions regarding the opinion, Castillo’s reply merely explained why he wasn’t there and put the onus on Weir to “tweak” the opinion. That was followed up by Weir’s second more detailed and more apparently exasperated reply.
Rather than excerpt and/or try to characterize the exchange further, since we have no space constraints we will reprint all three letters “(e)ntered into the record by Board of Ethics Member Paul Weil at the 10/15/09 Board of Ethics Meeting” here.
For background information click on the appropriate link to PNN coverage of county charter provision 20.02(D) and the BOE including our three part series linked on the left rail.
--------------
From: Paul Weil
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2009 8:41 AM
To: Alfred Castillo Jr.
Cc: Leila Fuller
Subject: Opinion Letter
Good morning, Al:
I was disappointed that Mr. Trask was not familiar with, and stated, in effect, that he was barely aware of our meeting and extended conversation. Regrettably, I believe that the waters are only further muddied.
I realize that you, some of the Administration, and some members of the BOE would simply like to get this matter behind them. But it wont simply go away unless and until you properly close the serious gap in the Opinion.
Chairwoman Fuller expressed to me that she was pleased with the opinion because it said in writing what your predecessor had told the Board in leading to their opinion in the Chun matter. I still cannot reach that suggested conclusion.
Assuming, arguendo, that you are correct in concluding that the Charter provision and the Code Section must be read together, I am simply unable to find legal support for the conclusion recited in Mr. Trask's opinion, which you endorsed.
As I told you, I have read and re-read the provisions and simply cannot make that leap. It is incumbent upon you or your office to provide definitive information and guidelines.
Simply put, why, if at all, does 20.02D not apply to an Attorney who is a member of a Board or Commission, representing a private client or interest before another Board or agency? How, if at all, does 3-1.7 or any other section of the Code provide an exception? If you can properly answer those questions and bridge the flaw and gap, you may be able to convince me and the properly restless public. I would hate to think that, once again, you (and some members of the BOE) start with a desired conclusion and then work to justify the result.
I ask again that you explicitly and with specificity explain how you make that leap. Whether or not a fee is fixed or contingent, there is an obvious Conflict of Interest in such representation. Dancing around the issue wont make it go away. I'm sure that you would hate to see some citizen or group test the issue in Court.
I’ll be happy to discuss.
PAUL
----------
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2009 3:59 PM
To: Paul Well
Subject: RE: Opinion Letter
Paul,
Thank you for your hospitality. Well, after I visited with you I had to rush back to Lihu`e to meet with the Mayor. The meeting with the Mayor took more than 2 hours. I got home about 6:45 p.m. I was exhausted and did not want to pack. I woke up at 4:30 a.m. because I had to be at the Lihu`e Airport at 5:15 a.m. I had a meeting with my deputy in Honolulu at 7:30 p.m. The HGEA arbitration hearing started at 9:00 a.m. I called Mauna Kea and Mona to brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics. I also mentioned to both of them that I sat down with you the day before.
There may be a few areas in which we may tweak. I do not know whether or not we will be able to meet your expectations and the standards that you require. I'm curious? How would you bridge the gap?
al
--------
From: Paul Weil
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2009 12 29 PM
To: 'Alfred Castillo Jr '
Subject: RE Opinion
Aloha, Al.
I'm glad that I deferred responding to your email. One should never respond when disappointed, frustrated, or angry. I was all three.
Sorry that you had a bad day Thursday, but mine was, in many ways, worse. Particularly when compared to Wednesday when I felt that we had enjoyed a candid and productive meeting, sharing ideas as we continued to strive for the welfare and benefit of the people of Kauai. I had been especially heartened by your expressions of agreement in many areas as I reviewed with you the latest iteration of an Opinion letter from your office and pointed out the shortcomings and errors in the document. I stated to you and I said publicly that this letter is a far superior product to that produced by your predecessor and/or by your office in the past. But, as we discussed at length, and as I publicly stated, it still falls far short.
Nor do I understand why the letter, which was prepared in late June, was not delivered until early September! Ripening did not make it any better.
There are those who have publicly stated that you had previously tried to "co-opt" me. I now believe that they may have been right. But, following the old adage of "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me", it won’t happen again. Nor can I be bullied, intimidated or coerced. You see, I am not seeking any separate personal benefit from my volunteer service. I am not and will not be a candidate for any office or appointment. I will respond appropriately the next time anyone from your office again insults me or patronizes me, publicly or otherwise, as Mr. Trask again did at the BOE meeting.
I appreciate that you apologized to me for your statements and actions at the prior Board meeting. I urge you to attend the next BOE meeting and apologize to the entire Board. I really expected that, as I had suggested, you might withdraw the letter and make proper revisions along the lines of our discussion.
Boy, was I wrong! The same old game became apparent when your Deputy started by denying that he had spoken with you; then later stating that he had only a "brief general discussion" with you, and then proceeded to demonstrate that he was familiar with at least the major points of our extended discussion and was prepared to try to rebut! They also neglected to state that you had briefed them on how to handle the Board!
As for your statement that you were only able to "brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics", I believe that they did a very good job of following your instructions. That is, if your instructions were to stonewall; to obfuscate; to continue a program of less than subtle attacks maligning, patronizing and insulting those who had contrary views; avoiding questions and discussion; providing specious and erroneous explanations to try to justify some of the statements in the Opinion letter; playing to friendly or seemingly sympathetic members of the Board (some of whom, I believe, want only that their prior actions in the Chun matter be vindicated and the entire mess forgotten); and, by Mr. Trask, following your own example of getting out of there at the first opportunity, departing before the end of the meeting claiming that other duties prevented him from remaining to respond to further discussion or questions and dumping it on Mona!
• Unfortunately, you did not instruct them to provide what I was led by you to believe was the open candor that I felt you tried to show during our meeting at my home. None was shown at the Board meeting. It may be good politics, but it's lousy lawyering. The Board and the County are entitled to better.
I realize that you feel some pressure. As you told me, the mayor and John Isobe are concerned because four Board or Commission members have resigned, allegedly because of actions by the BOE. I can only respond, so be it. Neither you nor the Board should twist the law to accommodate or solve such "problems".
You go on to state that "/ do riot know whether or not we will be able to meet your expectations and the standards that you require". Let's be clear; these are not MY expectations and standards. They are the proper expectations and standards imposed upon you as County Attorney. They are, quite properly, the expectations and standards of the citizens of Kauai.
You then state that "there may be a few areas in which we may tweak," Did you laugh as you wrote that one, Al knowing full well that "tweaking a few areas" falls far short of really correcting the admitted distortions and omissions in the document?
I hope that your "tweaking" will include removing the suggested illustrations of absurdities which, themselves, are simply even more absurd, since they ignore the fact that a meeting with a water dept. clerk or a police officer, both of whose duties are ministerial to be performed within the scope of rules and regulations promulgated by the governing agency, is not an "appearance" before that governing agency. The clerk or police officer has no discretionary or policymaking authority, is performing a purely ministerial function, and there cannot be a conflict of interest under such circumstances. Trying to stretch that far simply discredits and makes suspect other assertions in the Opinion. It may be correctable by proper further "tweaking" of the definitions. Leaving them in as illustrations would likely mislead the Board, the Council and others in the future. As we discussed and as you had agreed, they are, simply, wrong.
Further, The Opinion fails to specifically address the three questions submitted by the Board at its August meeting and previously set forth in my July 24 m email to Mr. Trask with a cc to you.
(a)whether a charitable non-profit organization providing eleemosynary* services to our community is a "private interest" within the meaning of the Code (this does not include unions, political organization, PACS, or other non-profits which are not based upon charitable purposes);
(THIS ONE IS PARTIALLY, THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY OR COMPLETELY, ANSWERED IN THE LATEST OPINION LETTER).
(b) whether the County Council can adopt legislation clarifying the issues in the Chun case for others who might be similarly situated in the future or if this would be an improper attempt to amend the Charter;
(WE DISCUSSED THIS POSSIBLE APPROACH BUT THE BOE NEEDS THE REQUESTED SPECIFIC OPINION FROM YOU ON WHETHER AND HOW THIS CAN BE DONE. I ALSO REALIZE THAT THE COUNCIL MAY NOT BE WILLING TO HANDLE WHAT COULD BE A CONTROVERSIAL MATTER.)
(c) the affect, if any, of the voters' rejection of the Charter Commission's proposed Amendment at the last election. I have restrained from going public with these thoughts and concerns other than those expressed at the Board meeting and in my email exchanges and discussion with you. I fear that the same may not be said about your office. However, this exchange of emails is not subject to any Privilege since it is all addressed to me individually. I waive any such privilege, if one actually exists, since it would belong to me and not to you or the BOE. I therefore invite you to provide copies to the Mayor, to Mr. Isobe and to others as may be appropriate. Just let me know so that I can be sure that my remarks are unexpurgated and unedited.
Lastly, you use the old ploy of trying to dump the problem on my side of the field by asking how I would bridge the gap! I think that you must be aware that the chasm created by your predecessor and perpetuated by your office is too deep and too wide to be bridged by trying to cover it with sand, as your predecessor tried and as you have been doing. The simple answer is, it cannot be done without either changing the Charter (which was defeated by the voters) or by adopting clarifying legislation if, in fact, that can legally be done in a fashion which can withstand judicial scrutiny, all as discussed above.
Your attempts to follow your predecessor's lead and blow it away with a ruling that concludes that the Charter provision and the existing purported codification in Sections 3-1 et seq. just doesn't get you there. Neither you nor Mr. Trask have undertaken to show us how reading any of those sections with the Charter provision brings the result you so fondly desire. Instead, your office again provides broad generalities and unsupportable declaratory conclusions without regard to proper cogent legal standards. Rather, you leave it in the dictatorial or parental mode of "I said it, so it must be right"!
Once again, I'll be happy to discuss and to try to further assist in any way reasonably possible. It's up to you. None of this will simply go away.
PAUL
*eleemosynary [adj] generous in assistance to the poor; "a benevolent contributor"; "eleemosynary relief"; "philanthropic contributions"
In the document- released to the public and posted at the local newspaper’s web site by reporter Michael Levine-.Weir calls the latest opinion “lousy lawyering” and states that “(n)either you nor the Board should twist the law to accommodate or solve such "problems"
Weil had previously called the opinion “fatally flawed.” The letters apparently followed a meeting between Castillo and Weil at Weil’s home.
Weil wrote to Castillo that after the meeting he expected Castillo to come to the next BOE meeting but instead Castillo sent his deputy Mauna Kea Trask.
He wrote:
I really expected that, as I had suggested, you might withdraw the (opinion) letter and make proper revisions along the lines of our discussion.
Boy, was I wrong! The same old game became apparent when your Deputy started by denying that he had spoken with you; then later stating that he had only a "brief general discussion" with you, and then proceeded to demonstrate that he was familiar with at least the major points of our extended discussion and was prepared to try to rebut! They also neglected to state that you had briefed them on how to handle the Board!
As for your statement that you were only able to "brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics", I believe that they did a very good job of following your instructions. That is, if your instructions were to stonewall; to obfuscate; to continue a program of less than subtle attacks maligning, patronizing and insulting those who had contrary views; avoiding questions and discussion; providing specious and erroneous explanations to try to justify some of the statements in the Opinion letter; playing to friendly or seemingly sympathetic members of the Board (some of whom, I believe, want only that their prior actions in the Chun matter be vindicated and the entire mess forgotten); and, by Mr. Trask, following your own example of getting out of there at the first opportunity, departing before the end of the meeting claiming that other duties prevented him from remaining to respond to further discussion or questions and dumping it on Mona!
The first letter from Weir to Castillo lays out his disappointment that Trask seemed unaware of their meeting and goes on to detail the specific problems with the opinion as well as Weir’s disappointment in Castillo’s absence from the BOE meeting.
But rather than address Weir’s specific questions regarding the opinion, Castillo’s reply merely explained why he wasn’t there and put the onus on Weir to “tweak” the opinion. That was followed up by Weir’s second more detailed and more apparently exasperated reply.
Rather than excerpt and/or try to characterize the exchange further, since we have no space constraints we will reprint all three letters “(e)ntered into the record by Board of Ethics Member Paul Weil at the 10/15/09 Board of Ethics Meeting” here.
For background information click on the appropriate link to PNN coverage of county charter provision 20.02(D) and the BOE including our three part series linked on the left rail.
--------------
From: Paul Weil
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2009 8:41 AM
To: Alfred Castillo Jr.
Cc: Leila Fuller
Subject: Opinion Letter
Good morning, Al:
I was disappointed that Mr. Trask was not familiar with, and stated, in effect, that he was barely aware of our meeting and extended conversation. Regrettably, I believe that the waters are only further muddied.
I realize that you, some of the Administration, and some members of the BOE would simply like to get this matter behind them. But it wont simply go away unless and until you properly close the serious gap in the Opinion.
Chairwoman Fuller expressed to me that she was pleased with the opinion because it said in writing what your predecessor had told the Board in leading to their opinion in the Chun matter. I still cannot reach that suggested conclusion.
Assuming, arguendo, that you are correct in concluding that the Charter provision and the Code Section must be read together, I am simply unable to find legal support for the conclusion recited in Mr. Trask's opinion, which you endorsed.
As I told you, I have read and re-read the provisions and simply cannot make that leap. It is incumbent upon you or your office to provide definitive information and guidelines.
Simply put, why, if at all, does 20.02D not apply to an Attorney who is a member of a Board or Commission, representing a private client or interest before another Board or agency? How, if at all, does 3-1.7 or any other section of the Code provide an exception? If you can properly answer those questions and bridge the flaw and gap, you may be able to convince me and the properly restless public. I would hate to think that, once again, you (and some members of the BOE) start with a desired conclusion and then work to justify the result.
I ask again that you explicitly and with specificity explain how you make that leap. Whether or not a fee is fixed or contingent, there is an obvious Conflict of Interest in such representation. Dancing around the issue wont make it go away. I'm sure that you would hate to see some citizen or group test the issue in Court.
I’ll be happy to discuss.
PAUL
----------
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2009 3:59 PM
To: Paul Well
Subject: RE: Opinion Letter
Paul,
Thank you for your hospitality. Well, after I visited with you I had to rush back to Lihu`e to meet with the Mayor. The meeting with the Mayor took more than 2 hours. I got home about 6:45 p.m. I was exhausted and did not want to pack. I woke up at 4:30 a.m. because I had to be at the Lihu`e Airport at 5:15 a.m. I had a meeting with my deputy in Honolulu at 7:30 p.m. The HGEA arbitration hearing started at 9:00 a.m. I called Mauna Kea and Mona to brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics. I also mentioned to both of them that I sat down with you the day before.
There may be a few areas in which we may tweak. I do not know whether or not we will be able to meet your expectations and the standards that you require. I'm curious? How would you bridge the gap?
al
--------
From: Paul Weil
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2009 12 29 PM
To: 'Alfred Castillo Jr '
Subject: RE Opinion
Aloha, Al.
I'm glad that I deferred responding to your email. One should never respond when disappointed, frustrated, or angry. I was all three.
Sorry that you had a bad day Thursday, but mine was, in many ways, worse. Particularly when compared to Wednesday when I felt that we had enjoyed a candid and productive meeting, sharing ideas as we continued to strive for the welfare and benefit of the people of Kauai. I had been especially heartened by your expressions of agreement in many areas as I reviewed with you the latest iteration of an Opinion letter from your office and pointed out the shortcomings and errors in the document. I stated to you and I said publicly that this letter is a far superior product to that produced by your predecessor and/or by your office in the past. But, as we discussed at length, and as I publicly stated, it still falls far short.
Nor do I understand why the letter, which was prepared in late June, was not delivered until early September! Ripening did not make it any better.
There are those who have publicly stated that you had previously tried to "co-opt" me. I now believe that they may have been right. But, following the old adage of "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me", it won’t happen again. Nor can I be bullied, intimidated or coerced. You see, I am not seeking any separate personal benefit from my volunteer service. I am not and will not be a candidate for any office or appointment. I will respond appropriately the next time anyone from your office again insults me or patronizes me, publicly or otherwise, as Mr. Trask again did at the BOE meeting.
I appreciate that you apologized to me for your statements and actions at the prior Board meeting. I urge you to attend the next BOE meeting and apologize to the entire Board. I really expected that, as I had suggested, you might withdraw the letter and make proper revisions along the lines of our discussion.
Boy, was I wrong! The same old game became apparent when your Deputy started by denying that he had spoken with you; then later stating that he had only a "brief general discussion" with you, and then proceeded to demonstrate that he was familiar with at least the major points of our extended discussion and was prepared to try to rebut! They also neglected to state that you had briefed them on how to handle the Board!
As for your statement that you were only able to "brief them on how we should handle the day with Ethics", I believe that they did a very good job of following your instructions. That is, if your instructions were to stonewall; to obfuscate; to continue a program of less than subtle attacks maligning, patronizing and insulting those who had contrary views; avoiding questions and discussion; providing specious and erroneous explanations to try to justify some of the statements in the Opinion letter; playing to friendly or seemingly sympathetic members of the Board (some of whom, I believe, want only that their prior actions in the Chun matter be vindicated and the entire mess forgotten); and, by Mr. Trask, following your own example of getting out of there at the first opportunity, departing before the end of the meeting claiming that other duties prevented him from remaining to respond to further discussion or questions and dumping it on Mona!
• Unfortunately, you did not instruct them to provide what I was led by you to believe was the open candor that I felt you tried to show during our meeting at my home. None was shown at the Board meeting. It may be good politics, but it's lousy lawyering. The Board and the County are entitled to better.
I realize that you feel some pressure. As you told me, the mayor and John Isobe are concerned because four Board or Commission members have resigned, allegedly because of actions by the BOE. I can only respond, so be it. Neither you nor the Board should twist the law to accommodate or solve such "problems".
You go on to state that "/ do riot know whether or not we will be able to meet your expectations and the standards that you require". Let's be clear; these are not MY expectations and standards. They are the proper expectations and standards imposed upon you as County Attorney. They are, quite properly, the expectations and standards of the citizens of Kauai.
You then state that "there may be a few areas in which we may tweak," Did you laugh as you wrote that one, Al knowing full well that "tweaking a few areas" falls far short of really correcting the admitted distortions and omissions in the document?
I hope that your "tweaking" will include removing the suggested illustrations of absurdities which, themselves, are simply even more absurd, since they ignore the fact that a meeting with a water dept. clerk or a police officer, both of whose duties are ministerial to be performed within the scope of rules and regulations promulgated by the governing agency, is not an "appearance" before that governing agency. The clerk or police officer has no discretionary or policymaking authority, is performing a purely ministerial function, and there cannot be a conflict of interest under such circumstances. Trying to stretch that far simply discredits and makes suspect other assertions in the Opinion. It may be correctable by proper further "tweaking" of the definitions. Leaving them in as illustrations would likely mislead the Board, the Council and others in the future. As we discussed and as you had agreed, they are, simply, wrong.
Further, The Opinion fails to specifically address the three questions submitted by the Board at its August meeting and previously set forth in my July 24 m email to Mr. Trask with a cc to you.
(a)whether a charitable non-profit organization providing eleemosynary* services to our community is a "private interest" within the meaning of the Code (this does not include unions, political organization, PACS, or other non-profits which are not based upon charitable purposes);
(THIS ONE IS PARTIALLY, THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY OR COMPLETELY, ANSWERED IN THE LATEST OPINION LETTER).
(b) whether the County Council can adopt legislation clarifying the issues in the Chun case for others who might be similarly situated in the future or if this would be an improper attempt to amend the Charter;
(WE DISCUSSED THIS POSSIBLE APPROACH BUT THE BOE NEEDS THE REQUESTED SPECIFIC OPINION FROM YOU ON WHETHER AND HOW THIS CAN BE DONE. I ALSO REALIZE THAT THE COUNCIL MAY NOT BE WILLING TO HANDLE WHAT COULD BE A CONTROVERSIAL MATTER.)
(c) the affect, if any, of the voters' rejection of the Charter Commission's proposed Amendment at the last election. I have restrained from going public with these thoughts and concerns other than those expressed at the Board meeting and in my email exchanges and discussion with you. I fear that the same may not be said about your office. However, this exchange of emails is not subject to any Privilege since it is all addressed to me individually. I waive any such privilege, if one actually exists, since it would belong to me and not to you or the BOE. I therefore invite you to provide copies to the Mayor, to Mr. Isobe and to others as may be appropriate. Just let me know so that I can be sure that my remarks are unexpurgated and unedited.
Lastly, you use the old ploy of trying to dump the problem on my side of the field by asking how I would bridge the gap! I think that you must be aware that the chasm created by your predecessor and perpetuated by your office is too deep and too wide to be bridged by trying to cover it with sand, as your predecessor tried and as you have been doing. The simple answer is, it cannot be done without either changing the Charter (which was defeated by the voters) or by adopting clarifying legislation if, in fact, that can legally be done in a fashion which can withstand judicial scrutiny, all as discussed above.
Your attempts to follow your predecessor's lead and blow it away with a ruling that concludes that the Charter provision and the existing purported codification in Sections 3-1 et seq. just doesn't get you there. Neither you nor Mr. Trask have undertaken to show us how reading any of those sections with the Charter provision brings the result you so fondly desire. Instead, your office again provides broad generalities and unsupportable declaratory conclusions without regard to proper cogent legal standards. Rather, you leave it in the dictatorial or parental mode of "I said it, so it must be right"!
Once again, I'll be happy to discuss and to try to further assist in any way reasonably possible. It's up to you. None of this will simply go away.
PAUL
*eleemosynary [adj] generous in assistance to the poor; "a benevolent contributor"; "eleemosynary relief"; "philanthropic contributions"
Friday, November 20, 2009
POLITICAL WON’T
POLITICAL WON’T: Our post Wednesday on the flakey “opinion” given to the charter commission regarding the county manager issue drew a couple of comments that deserve exposition, on an issue we kind of glossed over because it seemed to be self-apparent to us- but obviously not to everybody.
Doug White, who’s left a huge hole in the blogosphere since June when he last posted to his Poinography blog, asked
...under a manager system, who or what would lead the Executive Branch? If that leader is chosen by the Legislative Branch, then in effect there would be no autonomous Executive Branch, and thus no separation of powers. That's how I interpret the CA opinion.
Attorney blogger Charley Foster was of course more to the legal point saying
I think a better way for the county attorney to have argued it would have been to point out that plain text of HRS §46-1.5(1) requires counties to "establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization," and that the proposed manager system would establish only an "administrative and legislative structure" in violation of the plain language of the statute. As Doug points out, a "mayor" who is chosen by and serves at the pleasure of the council is not really an "executive." It is true that separation of powers is at the heart of the issue and of the three-branches requirement. But it's possible to argue that the plain meaning of the statute requires an independent executive department without having to invoke that other doctrine.
So let’s look at the words in the relevant constitution and statue passages.
In Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask opinion he cites the fact that:
Art. VIII, section 2, Hawaii State Constitution states: Each political subdivision shall have the power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits and under such procedures as may be provided by general law. Such procedures, however, shall not require the approval of a charter by a legislative body.
Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision's executive, legislative and administrative structure and organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and functions...
HRS section 46-1.5(1) states: Each county shall have the power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government, which shall establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization, including but not limited to, the method of appointment or election of officials, their duties, responsibilities, and compensation, and the terms of their office.
Nothing there mentions any “autonomous” executive or an executive “branch”, certainly nothing about “separation of powers.” and as a matter of fact the law allows for the “county... to frame and adopt a charter” and determine “the method of appointment OR election of officials” (emphasis added).
Clearly the county may do whatever it pleases as far as not just the method of selecting or electing it’s executive officer but need not make any of them autonomous or adhere to any separation of powers doctrine. As a matter of fact, currently the executive and the administrative entities are indeed part of the same organizational structure with the mayor appointing and overseeing the department heads without any autonomy or separation of powers.
As matter of fact. unless you use an adjective to describe the word “executive”- one that isn’t in the law- no one can argue a county manager (CM) would not be an executive
All a county manager system would do is switch the executive to legislative oversight and make that position appointed rather than elected.
And, it would seem that by saying “appointment or election” the statue leaves room for a county manager type system. Any argument against an unelected executive is clearly a political rather than a legal one.
It should also be pointed out that currently the charter provides for an administrative assistant (AA) whose duties are very close to what a county manager’s would be. That position- who serves solely at the pleasure of the mayor- is one that has routinely overseen department heads on a day to day basis leaving the mayor free to look at the “big picture”, concentrate on “the vision thing” by delegating the nuts and bolts to the AA.
We also mentioned Wednesday that Trask included a section that makes it clear that no more than what is stated in the constitution and statute should be read into it- despite the fact that after saying that he proceeds to read into it separation of powers, checks and balances, autonomy and the lack of an election of the executive.
Trask writes:
According to the law, "The fundamental principle in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intention of the framers and the people adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself. When the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the court, in construing it, is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument." State ex rel. Anzai v. City & County of Honolulu, 99 Haw. 508, 519, 57 P.3d 433, 444 (2002).
Moreover, a constitutional provision must be construed in connection with other provisions of the instrument, and also in the light of the circumstances under which it was adopted and the history preceding it." Blair v. Harris, 98 Haw. 179, 45 P.3d 798, 801 (2002).
So let’s look at Trask’s arguments one by one:
The phrase included in both Art. VIII, section 2 and HRS section 46-1.5(1) requiring that each county "shall establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization", is interpreted by the County Attorney's office to require each county within the state to have specific separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, which the proposed council-county manager form would not have.
Given that the words “separation of powers” aren’t in the law and the fact that there is currently no separation of powers between the executive and administrative entitles- note also the lack of the word “branches” in law- this argument is clearly erroneous especially since “intent is to be found in the instrument itself” and that one “is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument”.
Trask continues:
Furthermore, so as to not render either the, "legislative, executive, or administrative structure and organization," of the county superfluous, void or insignificant said branches need to be substantive and not merely formal.
We’re not quite sure what that means and whether it is a differentiation without a difference but assuming it isn’t, well, the current attachment of the administration to the executive belies irrelevance.
He then seeks to establish what may be called a four prong test.
The proposed amendment would be contrary to both the text and the intent of the State Constitution and the general laws of Hawaii, and therefore illegal, for the following reasons:
1. The State Constitution and the general laws on the subject clearly and unambiguously call for the counties to establish a legislative, executive, and administrative structure and organization of government.
True- and clearly that “structure and organization” is up to the county to determine as long as all three exist- which they would as we established under a county manager executive, certainly to the extent that they exist now.
2. Passage of the proposed amendment would deprive the public of their constitutional and statutory right to a democratically elected executive.
It’s hard to say where he found a “constitutional and statutory right to a democratically elected executive” since the words “democratically elected” not only do not appear but the statute specifically allows for an appointed executive.
And as to any national constitutional or statutory prohibition, how many hundreds of county manager systems exist and have presumably passed legal muster around the country?
3. The proposed council-county manager form of government would deprive the public of a democratic governmental structure that employs checks and balances that would ensure that no particular branch would get too powerful and abuse the representative system of democracy. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that the proposed amendment seeks to delete section 4.03 of the charter thus extinguishing the executive veto power.
We’re not quite sure what the relevance of this is but again the words “checks and balances” do not appear anywhere. Clearly this is a political argument and not a legal one.
4. Under the proposed amendment the council chair would be given
the title of "mayor” but would not exercise any executive authority. Such a titular mayor would not satisfy the mandate of either the constitution or the general laws on the subject.
Ceremonial mayors are common under county manager systems, where the executive is the county manager not the mayor if we’re looking for the “substantive” executive. As a matter of fact some mayors are even appointed by the legislative entity, some on a rotating basis from among the legislative members.
Trask implies that only a title of mayor bestows executive status- clearly an erroneous and presumptuous assertion.
The preconceived notions, the use of the straw man of the specific Lewis proposal to condemn all CM systems- illogically generalizing from the specific argument- and the outright interpretation based on additional language not found in law- especially when the law bans that- and causes Trask’s analysis to fall on it’s fallacious face.
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Also on Wednesday, we cited the inability of the council to compel administrative testimony without a formal investigation under the current charter as one of the good arguments for a CM system.
Doug also asked
... has the Council ever actually went the official investigation and subpoena route? If not, then they are fools for not at least trying to exhaust their existing powers before seeking a Charter change, aren't they?
That’s somewhat of a complicated question.- one that has roots in the political, statutory and fiscal realms.
Calling for and authorizing an investigation to obtain subpoena power every time an administrative person doesn’t show up when requested is pretty cumbersome and impractical.
For the last 10 years the council has at times sought to launch investigations. The first obstacle was the lack of any set method of doing so. After dickering around for a year or so they finally passed a resolution that defined a process. But then it became a political football as to which department to investigate first.
Originally it was to be the massive Department of Public Works but the word “massive” was the operative obstacle. Which division to investigate became a problem because so many of them were problematic. Finally a half a million dollars was appropriated to investigate one division but no one could decide which one to investigate.
But then a new council took office and with the departure of a majority of members- including the three main proponents, now-State Senator Gary Hooser, now 5th Circuit Judge Randall Valenciano and then-Chair Ron Kouchi, the newbies decided to investigate the police department instead- a subject well covered in KPD Blue.
The next decision was to, instead of spending lots of money to look at a tree amidst the forest, appropriate salaries for a county auditor position and staff to be able to essentially conduct investigations without having to deal with the cost and limitations of each investigation.
But again after procrastinating over the hiring, the County Attorney stepped in and said this would violate the prohibition of council interference with the administration.
Finally last November the voters passed a charter amendment establishing a county auditor under council services that was specifically exempt from the prohibitions on interference. A month or so back one was appointed by the council.
But really this has been an exercise in lack of political will all along with a majority of the council member eyeing the mayor’s job and not wanting to tie his or her own hands once they took office.
Clear as mud?
--------
With the holiday and resultant “so much basketball, so little time” next week we’ll be a little lite in posting- here’s a little lite reading regarding the whole Board of Ethics 20.02D business which we’ll try to address during half times and between games.
Doug White, who’s left a huge hole in the blogosphere since June when he last posted to his Poinography blog, asked
...under a manager system, who or what would lead the Executive Branch? If that leader is chosen by the Legislative Branch, then in effect there would be no autonomous Executive Branch, and thus no separation of powers. That's how I interpret the CA opinion.
Attorney blogger Charley Foster was of course more to the legal point saying
I think a better way for the county attorney to have argued it would have been to point out that plain text of HRS §46-1.5(1) requires counties to "establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization," and that the proposed manager system would establish only an "administrative and legislative structure" in violation of the plain language of the statute. As Doug points out, a "mayor" who is chosen by and serves at the pleasure of the council is not really an "executive." It is true that separation of powers is at the heart of the issue and of the three-branches requirement. But it's possible to argue that the plain meaning of the statute requires an independent executive department without having to invoke that other doctrine.
So let’s look at the words in the relevant constitution and statue passages.
In Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask opinion he cites the fact that:
Art. VIII, section 2, Hawaii State Constitution states: Each political subdivision shall have the power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits and under such procedures as may be provided by general law. Such procedures, however, shall not require the approval of a charter by a legislative body.
Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision's executive, legislative and administrative structure and organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and functions...
HRS section 46-1.5(1) states: Each county shall have the power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government, which shall establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization, including but not limited to, the method of appointment or election of officials, their duties, responsibilities, and compensation, and the terms of their office.
Nothing there mentions any “autonomous” executive or an executive “branch”, certainly nothing about “separation of powers.” and as a matter of fact the law allows for the “county... to frame and adopt a charter” and determine “the method of appointment OR election of officials” (emphasis added).
Clearly the county may do whatever it pleases as far as not just the method of selecting or electing it’s executive officer but need not make any of them autonomous or adhere to any separation of powers doctrine. As a matter of fact, currently the executive and the administrative entities are indeed part of the same organizational structure with the mayor appointing and overseeing the department heads without any autonomy or separation of powers.
As matter of fact. unless you use an adjective to describe the word “executive”- one that isn’t in the law- no one can argue a county manager (CM) would not be an executive
All a county manager system would do is switch the executive to legislative oversight and make that position appointed rather than elected.
And, it would seem that by saying “appointment or election” the statue leaves room for a county manager type system. Any argument against an unelected executive is clearly a political rather than a legal one.
It should also be pointed out that currently the charter provides for an administrative assistant (AA) whose duties are very close to what a county manager’s would be. That position- who serves solely at the pleasure of the mayor- is one that has routinely overseen department heads on a day to day basis leaving the mayor free to look at the “big picture”, concentrate on “the vision thing” by delegating the nuts and bolts to the AA.
We also mentioned Wednesday that Trask included a section that makes it clear that no more than what is stated in the constitution and statute should be read into it- despite the fact that after saying that he proceeds to read into it separation of powers, checks and balances, autonomy and the lack of an election of the executive.
Trask writes:
According to the law, "The fundamental principle in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intention of the framers and the people adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself. When the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the court, in construing it, is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument." State ex rel. Anzai v. City & County of Honolulu, 99 Haw. 508, 519, 57 P.3d 433, 444 (2002).
Moreover, a constitutional provision must be construed in connection with other provisions of the instrument, and also in the light of the circumstances under which it was adopted and the history preceding it." Blair v. Harris, 98 Haw. 179, 45 P.3d 798, 801 (2002).
So let’s look at Trask’s arguments one by one:
The phrase included in both Art. VIII, section 2 and HRS section 46-1.5(1) requiring that each county "shall establish the county executive, administrative, and legislative structure and organization", is interpreted by the County Attorney's office to require each county within the state to have specific separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, which the proposed council-county manager form would not have.
Given that the words “separation of powers” aren’t in the law and the fact that there is currently no separation of powers between the executive and administrative entitles- note also the lack of the word “branches” in law- this argument is clearly erroneous especially since “intent is to be found in the instrument itself” and that one “is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument”.
Trask continues:
Furthermore, so as to not render either the, "legislative, executive, or administrative structure and organization," of the county superfluous, void or insignificant said branches need to be substantive and not merely formal.
We’re not quite sure what that means and whether it is a differentiation without a difference but assuming it isn’t, well, the current attachment of the administration to the executive belies irrelevance.
He then seeks to establish what may be called a four prong test.
The proposed amendment would be contrary to both the text and the intent of the State Constitution and the general laws of Hawaii, and therefore illegal, for the following reasons:
1. The State Constitution and the general laws on the subject clearly and unambiguously call for the counties to establish a legislative, executive, and administrative structure and organization of government.
True- and clearly that “structure and organization” is up to the county to determine as long as all three exist- which they would as we established under a county manager executive, certainly to the extent that they exist now.
2. Passage of the proposed amendment would deprive the public of their constitutional and statutory right to a democratically elected executive.
It’s hard to say where he found a “constitutional and statutory right to a democratically elected executive” since the words “democratically elected” not only do not appear but the statute specifically allows for an appointed executive.
And as to any national constitutional or statutory prohibition, how many hundreds of county manager systems exist and have presumably passed legal muster around the country?
3. The proposed council-county manager form of government would deprive the public of a democratic governmental structure that employs checks and balances that would ensure that no particular branch would get too powerful and abuse the representative system of democracy. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that the proposed amendment seeks to delete section 4.03 of the charter thus extinguishing the executive veto power.
We’re not quite sure what the relevance of this is but again the words “checks and balances” do not appear anywhere. Clearly this is a political argument and not a legal one.
4. Under the proposed amendment the council chair would be given
the title of "mayor” but would not exercise any executive authority. Such a titular mayor would not satisfy the mandate of either the constitution or the general laws on the subject.
Ceremonial mayors are common under county manager systems, where the executive is the county manager not the mayor if we’re looking for the “substantive” executive. As a matter of fact some mayors are even appointed by the legislative entity, some on a rotating basis from among the legislative members.
Trask implies that only a title of mayor bestows executive status- clearly an erroneous and presumptuous assertion.
The preconceived notions, the use of the straw man of the specific Lewis proposal to condemn all CM systems- illogically generalizing from the specific argument- and the outright interpretation based on additional language not found in law- especially when the law bans that- and causes Trask’s analysis to fall on it’s fallacious face.
-------
Also on Wednesday, we cited the inability of the council to compel administrative testimony without a formal investigation under the current charter as one of the good arguments for a CM system.
Doug also asked
... has the Council ever actually went the official investigation and subpoena route? If not, then they are fools for not at least trying to exhaust their existing powers before seeking a Charter change, aren't they?
That’s somewhat of a complicated question.- one that has roots in the political, statutory and fiscal realms.
Calling for and authorizing an investigation to obtain subpoena power every time an administrative person doesn’t show up when requested is pretty cumbersome and impractical.
For the last 10 years the council has at times sought to launch investigations. The first obstacle was the lack of any set method of doing so. After dickering around for a year or so they finally passed a resolution that defined a process. But then it became a political football as to which department to investigate first.
Originally it was to be the massive Department of Public Works but the word “massive” was the operative obstacle. Which division to investigate became a problem because so many of them were problematic. Finally a half a million dollars was appropriated to investigate one division but no one could decide which one to investigate.
But then a new council took office and with the departure of a majority of members- including the three main proponents, now-State Senator Gary Hooser, now 5th Circuit Judge Randall Valenciano and then-Chair Ron Kouchi, the newbies decided to investigate the police department instead- a subject well covered in KPD Blue.
The next decision was to, instead of spending lots of money to look at a tree amidst the forest, appropriate salaries for a county auditor position and staff to be able to essentially conduct investigations without having to deal with the cost and limitations of each investigation.
But again after procrastinating over the hiring, the County Attorney stepped in and said this would violate the prohibition of council interference with the administration.
Finally last November the voters passed a charter amendment establishing a county auditor under council services that was specifically exempt from the prohibitions on interference. A month or so back one was appointed by the council.
But really this has been an exercise in lack of political will all along with a majority of the council member eyeing the mayor’s job and not wanting to tie his or her own hands once they took office.
Clear as mud?
--------
With the holiday and resultant “so much basketball, so little time” next week we’ll be a little lite in posting- here’s a little lite reading regarding the whole Board of Ethics 20.02D business which we’ll try to address during half times and between games.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
PAWED AND FLAWED AGAIN
PAWED AND FLAWED AGAIN: While sitting around kibitzing and kvetching in the council chambers with our pal Tony Sommer, former Honolulu Star- Bulletin Kauai Bureau Chief and author of “KPD Blue” he used to routinely pronounce judgment on the foibles and folly with one of his favorite sayings- “when you work for the king you carry the king’s sword”.
And that’s apparently the case with Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask’s newly released opinion on the proposed county manager system, obtained by the local paper’s ace reporter Mike Levine and posted on line to accompany his article on the document.
We’ll have a more detailed analysis as soon as we get a hold of an “OCA” text copy so quoting it isn’t a chore, but on first blush it appears that Trask simply self-selected his own bowling pins, set them up and knocked them down in a string of straw-man arguments replete with out-of-context suppositions and red herrings in order to declare the concept of a county manager system generally illegal in Hawai`i and maybe the country.
After glossing over the fact that the opinion is proposal specific- based on the unbelievably flawed document authored by Walter Lewis in an attempt to exact revenge for the county’s supreme court victory in declaring his “’Ohana” property tax charter amendment null and void (as we detailed last month)- he then attempts to use a broad brush and questionable interpretations of a passage in state law to argue that any CM system would be illegal, not just in Hawai`i but in the country in general.
Two examples stand out for their disingenuousness.
Unbelievably, after quoting case law requiring those interpreting state law to take the plain meaning at face value and not try to read something into it, Levine accurately reports
Section 46-1.5 of the Hawai`i Revised Statutes states that each county’s charter “shall establish the county executive, administrative and legislative structure and organization,” a phrase that “is interpreted by the County Attorney’s office to require each county within the state to have specific separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, which the proposed council-county manager system form would not have.”
If that isn’t reading into the words “county executive, administrative and legislative structure and organization,” that there must be a certain structure including a mayor and council it’s hard to imagine what would be.
The other we’ll discuss today- because it’s refereed to not just in the article but in a post by attorney-blogger Charley Foster who also apparently misses the point in Trask’s completely out of context use of one contention that accompanies the specific proposal.
As Foster writes:
Beyond the legal analysis, the county attorney goes on to strenuously argue against the county manager proposal on policy grounds, proposing answers to a number of criticisms of the current mayoral system. I especially like the attorney's response to what really is the most clueless of the criticisms:
The current exectutive branch of government interferes with the council's ability to enact public policy laws and investigate subjects for which it is responsible.
To which the attorney correctly replies –
This criticism misses the whole point of the American form of representative democracy that utilizes a system of checks and balances.
The problem is that if one actually read the passage in the proposal it specifically and uniquely refers not to general policy but to the main problem that has spurred some to support the CM system- the fact that the council has no ability to compel administrative personnel to come before the council to explain anything without an official investigation and subpoena, including on matters that the council must decide.
This was illustrated last year when the last council questioned the methodology- reported exclusively here, here and here- that the Department of Personnel uses to “reallocate” jobs- some say in order to manipulate the civil service system to place a mayor’s favored but unskilled choice in a job in place of a appropriately skilled and experienced hire.
But when the council tried to ask Personnel Services Division Malcolm “Mel” Fernandez to come before the council and explain himself, he actually refused.
But really what do you expect? We’ve been ambivalent from the start of a CM form of government and many of Trask’s political and policy arguments and criticisms are well founded- although what they’re doing in a legal analysis is a mystery.
They come from not just the overstated benefits contained in Lewis’s proposal- as drawn up and submitted by former charter commission member, the late Walter Briant- but from the actual piss-poor proposal which was apparently hastily drawn up by substituting the words “county manager” for the word mayor in the county charter and then adding a brief description of the method of appointment.
We’ve recommended from the start that the proponents slow down and properly study all relevant matters including the state constitution and laws, the political culture on Kaua`i, the real world way our system currently works- and doesn’t work- and an examination of the literally hundreds of different CM set-ups in use around the country (which certainly belies Trask’s contention that they violate the national constitution and national laws) and draw up a well considered specific proposal... something Trask even admits might pass legal muster before he contradicts himself.
We’ll have more when we get the OCA version and go over it but on first blush, as with another Trask penned option, it appears this one is also “fatally flawed”.
And that’s apparently the case with Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask’s newly released opinion on the proposed county manager system, obtained by the local paper’s ace reporter Mike Levine and posted on line to accompany his article on the document.
We’ll have a more detailed analysis as soon as we get a hold of an “OCA” text copy so quoting it isn’t a chore, but on first blush it appears that Trask simply self-selected his own bowling pins, set them up and knocked them down in a string of straw-man arguments replete with out-of-context suppositions and red herrings in order to declare the concept of a county manager system generally illegal in Hawai`i and maybe the country.
After glossing over the fact that the opinion is proposal specific- based on the unbelievably flawed document authored by Walter Lewis in an attempt to exact revenge for the county’s supreme court victory in declaring his “’Ohana” property tax charter amendment null and void (as we detailed last month)- he then attempts to use a broad brush and questionable interpretations of a passage in state law to argue that any CM system would be illegal, not just in Hawai`i but in the country in general.
Two examples stand out for their disingenuousness.
Unbelievably, after quoting case law requiring those interpreting state law to take the plain meaning at face value and not try to read something into it, Levine accurately reports
Section 46-1.5 of the Hawai`i Revised Statutes states that each county’s charter “shall establish the county executive, administrative and legislative structure and organization,” a phrase that “is interpreted by the County Attorney’s office to require each county within the state to have specific separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, which the proposed council-county manager system form would not have.”
If that isn’t reading into the words “county executive, administrative and legislative structure and organization,” that there must be a certain structure including a mayor and council it’s hard to imagine what would be.
The other we’ll discuss today- because it’s refereed to not just in the article but in a post by attorney-blogger Charley Foster who also apparently misses the point in Trask’s completely out of context use of one contention that accompanies the specific proposal.
As Foster writes:
Beyond the legal analysis, the county attorney goes on to strenuously argue against the county manager proposal on policy grounds, proposing answers to a number of criticisms of the current mayoral system. I especially like the attorney's response to what really is the most clueless of the criticisms:
The current exectutive branch of government interferes with the council's ability to enact public policy laws and investigate subjects for which it is responsible.
To which the attorney correctly replies –
This criticism misses the whole point of the American form of representative democracy that utilizes a system of checks and balances.
The problem is that if one actually read the passage in the proposal it specifically and uniquely refers not to general policy but to the main problem that has spurred some to support the CM system- the fact that the council has no ability to compel administrative personnel to come before the council to explain anything without an official investigation and subpoena, including on matters that the council must decide.
This was illustrated last year when the last council questioned the methodology- reported exclusively here, here and here- that the Department of Personnel uses to “reallocate” jobs- some say in order to manipulate the civil service system to place a mayor’s favored but unskilled choice in a job in place of a appropriately skilled and experienced hire.
But when the council tried to ask Personnel Services Division Malcolm “Mel” Fernandez to come before the council and explain himself, he actually refused.
But really what do you expect? We’ve been ambivalent from the start of a CM form of government and many of Trask’s political and policy arguments and criticisms are well founded- although what they’re doing in a legal analysis is a mystery.
They come from not just the overstated benefits contained in Lewis’s proposal- as drawn up and submitted by former charter commission member, the late Walter Briant- but from the actual piss-poor proposal which was apparently hastily drawn up by substituting the words “county manager” for the word mayor in the county charter and then adding a brief description of the method of appointment.
We’ve recommended from the start that the proponents slow down and properly study all relevant matters including the state constitution and laws, the political culture on Kaua`i, the real world way our system currently works- and doesn’t work- and an examination of the literally hundreds of different CM set-ups in use around the country (which certainly belies Trask’s contention that they violate the national constitution and national laws) and draw up a well considered specific proposal... something Trask even admits might pass legal muster before he contradicts himself.
We’ll have more when we get the OCA version and go over it but on first blush, as with another Trask penned option, it appears this one is also “fatally flawed”.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
DOGGIE DADA
DOGGIE DADA: Much has been written in the past two days about the “new” county attorney’s opinion regarding the county charter’s section 20.02(d) that prohibits any “officer of employee of the county (from) appear(ing) in behalf of private interests before any county board, commission or agency.”.
Two articles in the local paper (one linking to a pdf copy of the opinion) and an editorial laid out many of the absurdities of trying to say that, because reading the law in one somewhat absurd interpretation could lead to absurd results- like preventing someone from getting a water meter or a driver’s license- the whole law should not be enforced.
Then there’s the letter to the editor from Horace Stoessel who analyzes the opinion further and delineates the problems with the opinion. And of course blogger and attorney Charley Foster also got straight to the point once again.
We won’t rehash what they said. But though each is spot on as to what they do present, each fails to look at what the opinion, penned by Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask, actually says, especially regarding what if anything is new about it as compared to one penned over a year ago.
Of course as the newspaper article points out the opinion is still “fatally flawed” in trying to allow the county ordinance to be read “with” the charter even though the ordinance, which conflicts with the charter, must adhere to the charter not override it. In addition just because the ordinance covers some situations of conflict-of-interest doesn’t mean it covers all of them, another apparent contention.
We say apparent because the opinion goes into great detail about what the ordinance says but then abruptly ends without attempting to show it’s relationship to the charter or the conclusion.
In fact, as Stoessel writes, the ordinance never mentioned 20.02 much less provision "d" and rather only deals with 20.01.
Trask is apparently either an incredibly bad attorney or is disingenuously trying to support a forgone conclusion by presenting a wordy opinion that says nothing directly related to the matter at hand, selectively picking and choosing citations to twist the law to it.
The fatal flaw is contained early in the opinion when Trask cites HRS §1-16 which states that "laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another."
The problem with that is that under other provisions he conveniently omits, it applies under the supremacy doctrine- flowing from federal to state to local and giving constitutional documents supremacy over legislation at each level- which means that laws of the same jurisdictional level must be read together but when one law trumps another the lower law is null and void. In other words charter provisions must be read equally together but when comparing a charter provision to a county ordinance the charter always rules if they conflict.
But the one “new” citation when compared to the prior opinion is an actual HRS (state law) provision that deals with the oft cited circumstance of alleged “absurd results” of applying a law in a strict construction manner.
Trask writes that:
HRS §1-15 states, "Where the words of a law are ambiguous:
(1) The meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
(2) The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning.
(3) Every construction which leads to an absurdity shall be rejected."
The key is number three. Even though he tries to define “public interest” to be the opposite of private interest rather than personal interest- a matter we went into in depth in previous posts- even under his interpretation the law simply says that any time any constriction of a law yields an absurd result that specific result of that specific application is to be discarded.
So if the law were to prohibit one from getting a driver’s license the law simply does not apply in that specific circumstance.
This finally undermines the arguments of some on the board- specifically Mark Hubbard, Lei Fuller and to some extent Judy Lenthall- that because there might be absurd results in some contrived situations the whole law should be discarded including the blatant potential conflicts-of-interest violations that the law was designed to eliminate.
That should at least, if nothing else, end the raising of the red herring of the “absurd results”- the one Hubbard has clung to saying that because he could be denied a building permit he should be allowed to violate the law by appearing before county entities on behalf of a private interest.
While that solves one big impediment to enforcement of the charter it does leave one big question. Even though normal rational people would be able to tell these absurd results from those that are not absurd the three BOE members listed above have all been in violation of the real not-so-absurd provisions and so have been reluctant to essentially rule against themselves by fairly judging the applicability.
One of the contentions has been that non-profit 501(c)3 organizations should not be included because they “do good in the community”, something we have discussed and shown to be bogus in many situations at least according to those who oppose the goals of certain non-profits. For instance the Chamber of Commerce and the Sierra Club might not see the other one as doing good or benefiting the community.
But attorney-blogger Foster points out another reason by saying that non-profits often appear- as in Lenthall’s case as the Executive Director of the Kaua`i Food Bank- to ask for funds. He says that because there are limited funds for non-profits in government coffers, the “favor” of one non-profit over another is exactly what the charter provision envisions and is one of the main reasons it is included.
At this point unless the three obstructionist BOE members drop their silly self-interested positions and stop blocking enforcement, they are themselves guilty of another provision in the same charter section that prohibits using their positions to gain favor or grant special privileges for themselves or others.
The only problem there is, as we stated before, the BOE is the entity that is designated to hear any complaint like that. And presumably they would be the ones to determine what is and isn’t an absurd result of application.
As we said before as long as they, as a quasi judicial county entity, keep obstructing justice the courts may be the only resort for the community.
Two articles in the local paper (one linking to a pdf copy of the opinion) and an editorial laid out many of the absurdities of trying to say that, because reading the law in one somewhat absurd interpretation could lead to absurd results- like preventing someone from getting a water meter or a driver’s license- the whole law should not be enforced.
Then there’s the letter to the editor from Horace Stoessel who analyzes the opinion further and delineates the problems with the opinion. And of course blogger and attorney Charley Foster also got straight to the point once again.
We won’t rehash what they said. But though each is spot on as to what they do present, each fails to look at what the opinion, penned by Deputy County Attorney Mauna Kea Trask, actually says, especially regarding what if anything is new about it as compared to one penned over a year ago.
Of course as the newspaper article points out the opinion is still “fatally flawed” in trying to allow the county ordinance to be read “with” the charter even though the ordinance, which conflicts with the charter, must adhere to the charter not override it. In addition just because the ordinance covers some situations of conflict-of-interest doesn’t mean it covers all of them, another apparent contention.
We say apparent because the opinion goes into great detail about what the ordinance says but then abruptly ends without attempting to show it’s relationship to the charter or the conclusion.
In fact, as Stoessel writes, the ordinance never mentioned 20.02 much less provision "d" and rather only deals with 20.01.
Trask is apparently either an incredibly bad attorney or is disingenuously trying to support a forgone conclusion by presenting a wordy opinion that says nothing directly related to the matter at hand, selectively picking and choosing citations to twist the law to it.
The fatal flaw is contained early in the opinion when Trask cites HRS §1-16 which states that "laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another."
The problem with that is that under other provisions he conveniently omits, it applies under the supremacy doctrine- flowing from federal to state to local and giving constitutional documents supremacy over legislation at each level- which means that laws of the same jurisdictional level must be read together but when one law trumps another the lower law is null and void. In other words charter provisions must be read equally together but when comparing a charter provision to a county ordinance the charter always rules if they conflict.
But the one “new” citation when compared to the prior opinion is an actual HRS (state law) provision that deals with the oft cited circumstance of alleged “absurd results” of applying a law in a strict construction manner.
Trask writes that:
HRS §1-15 states, "Where the words of a law are ambiguous:
(1) The meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
(2) The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning.
(3) Every construction which leads to an absurdity shall be rejected."
The key is number three. Even though he tries to define “public interest” to be the opposite of private interest rather than personal interest- a matter we went into in depth in previous posts- even under his interpretation the law simply says that any time any constriction of a law yields an absurd result that specific result of that specific application is to be discarded.
So if the law were to prohibit one from getting a driver’s license the law simply does not apply in that specific circumstance.
This finally undermines the arguments of some on the board- specifically Mark Hubbard, Lei Fuller and to some extent Judy Lenthall- that because there might be absurd results in some contrived situations the whole law should be discarded including the blatant potential conflicts-of-interest violations that the law was designed to eliminate.
That should at least, if nothing else, end the raising of the red herring of the “absurd results”- the one Hubbard has clung to saying that because he could be denied a building permit he should be allowed to violate the law by appearing before county entities on behalf of a private interest.
While that solves one big impediment to enforcement of the charter it does leave one big question. Even though normal rational people would be able to tell these absurd results from those that are not absurd the three BOE members listed above have all been in violation of the real not-so-absurd provisions and so have been reluctant to essentially rule against themselves by fairly judging the applicability.
One of the contentions has been that non-profit 501(c)3 organizations should not be included because they “do good in the community”, something we have discussed and shown to be bogus in many situations at least according to those who oppose the goals of certain non-profits. For instance the Chamber of Commerce and the Sierra Club might not see the other one as doing good or benefiting the community.
But attorney-blogger Foster points out another reason by saying that non-profits often appear- as in Lenthall’s case as the Executive Director of the Kaua`i Food Bank- to ask for funds. He says that because there are limited funds for non-profits in government coffers, the “favor” of one non-profit over another is exactly what the charter provision envisions and is one of the main reasons it is included.
At this point unless the three obstructionist BOE members drop their silly self-interested positions and stop blocking enforcement, they are themselves guilty of another provision in the same charter section that prohibits using their positions to gain favor or grant special privileges for themselves or others.
The only problem there is, as we stated before, the BOE is the entity that is designated to hear any complaint like that. And presumably they would be the ones to determine what is and isn’t an absurd result of application.
As we said before as long as they, as a quasi judicial county entity, keep obstructing justice the courts may be the only resort for the community.
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