Tuesday, April 21, 2009

(PNN) Unethical culture- Government service with a personal “touch”- Part 3

Unethical culture- Government service with a personal “touch”

Part three- Deep Thoughts- a “Handy” Diversion.

One would think that a member of any ethics board or commission would be a proponent of the highest ethical standard. But on Kaua`i, as we’ve noted in the first two parts of this report, the three prime officers of our Board of Ethics have been in violation of the plain reading of the charter’s section 20.02(D) prohibitions on those “employees and officers” who “appear on behalf of a private interest” before an “agency board or commission” while serving on any of the county’s boards or commissions.

We detailed two recent cases- those of Dee Crowell of the water board and Jonathan Chun of the charter commission- where the BOE apparently chose to simply ignore those provisions of the charter and claim that, because the ordinance (Kaua`i County Code [KCC] Section 3) didn’t detail the prohibitions in the charter’s section 20.02(D) they didn’t have to be enforced, in violation of the supremacy principles expressed in the US Constitution.

So what was behind the thinking of those two chairs of the BOE- Mark Hubbard and Lei Fuller- and the secretary, Judith Lenthall, who are in apparent violation?

After the Crowell and Chun rulings clearing them of violating the charter, a group of citizens were outraged. Horace Stoessel, Bruce Pleas, Walter Lewis, Glenn Mickens and others were outraged and told the board so during and after the discussions.

(Note: In part 2 we said there was no apparent discussion of the Crowell decision at a BOE meeting. The minutes reveal the matter was decided at their 12/07 meeting. We apologize for the oversight).

In response past and current Chair Mark Hubbard – who has also served as chair of another board embroiled in discretionary controversy, the state Burial Council of Kaua`i- wrote and presented the BOE with a long and extremely revealing “memo” at their 4/08 meeting .

We will examine it here in detail.

We do so because the rambling letter reveals the mental machinations of a man- and board- trying his best to twist the meanings of words by isolating and equivocating them trying every rationale- whether valid or simply laughable- to clear others who were seeking to exonerate themselves and so, by precedent, Hubbard, Fuller and Lenthall from their apparently prohibited activities.

The letter, the contents of which was supported by the other BOE members according to the minutes of the 4/08 meeting, reveals what appears to be a basic lack of ethical standards and ability to make ethical judgment calls with an unbiased eye on the BOE’s part and an inability or unwillingness to apply the “to be liberally construed” provision of the Code of Ethics contained in KCC section 3.1.

We will excerpt the letter here and reprint it in full at the end of this article, Because we received only a paper version we had to type it in manually and although we read and re-read it a few times it may contain a typo or three, which we apologize for in advance.

After saying he represents only himself Hubbard actually admits that the board was seemingly oblivious to the section 20.02(D) prohibitions in the Crowell case saying:

When the board discussed Dee Crowell’s request for an advisory opinion in late 2007, I do not remember any discussion of how 20.02D might impact the opinion. I only remember referencing the County Code, section 3-1.7{d}. The board concluded that a Board of Water Commission appointee is not precluded from acting in a representative capacity before other County agencies and departments as long as he complied with code section 3-1.7.

He then says that during the Chun case:

I saw 20.02D for the first time in the light of its plain language and was shocked to realize that I had been on the Ethics board for several years (I have served at least one term prior to my current term without being aware of this issue. I guess it should not be surprising as I believe that this issue has been seldom if ever raised in the 40+ years of the Charter’s existence.

Amazingly he actually admits to apparently never having read the charter section on ethics or at least not giving it any thought before that time. He even admits that on reading the plain meeting he found himself in apparent violation.

But the next paragraph begins to show how his own prejudices- and conflict- clouds his own thinking. He says he:

talked with a former Ethics board member who said it could simply be interpreted to mean that no employee or officer could appear “wearing the hat of their office: in behalf of private interests before any agency, board or commission. This sounded reasonable to me.

Nowhere does any provision of charter, law or rule mention this “hat wearing” construction of Hubbard’s.

But rather than leave it at that he proceeds to try to deconstruct the key phrase and reconstruct it using alternative dictionary definitions of the words that take the words out of context of “appear on behalf of a private interest”

First he separates out the word “appear” from “on behalf of” saying

The word “appear”, particularly when used with the word “before” means “to come formally before an authoritative body”. Another definition is to “come into view, become visible”.

It’s called equivocation, not, as he says earlier being “exact, specific, rational and literal”. “Appear on behalf of” is never a phrase that uses “appear” to mean simply come into view but is rather in the sense that an attorney “appears on behalf” of a client.

Then he continues to work on the words “on behalf of” trying to also separate them from appear” and redefine so it, saying it

can mean in support of, in the interest of, for the benefit of, as a representative of, in defense of. It is my belief, in hearing testimony by Walter Lewis and Horace Stoessel, that they believe that the primary meaning and possibly the only relevant meaning in the context of 20.02D is “as a representative of”. again, I maintain that there are different interpretations here.

To isolate them from appear is to falsify the plain meaning of the phrase by taking them out of context. to read them together is to give them plain meaning

Finally he deconstructs a “private inertest” and tries to pull it out of context saying

“Private interests”, by dictionary definition, means “intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, group or class”. Yet, I heard Walter Lewis state in his testimony that he felt that the meaning in 20.02D did not include “personal interest” but only the interest of another person or entity. That jives with the above interpretation of behalf = represent. Here again, we have different interpretations.

Whatever Walter Lewis said or didn’t say is irrelevant. In addition to there being a huge difference between a private and public interest (we’ll get to that later) it also removes the two words from the context of the whole phrase.

Hubbard uses this later to say that renewing his driver’s license would seem to be prohibited by this phrase but he ignores the fact that one does not “appear on behalf of” one’s self but rather appears AS one’s self. One cannot refer to one’s self in the third person except as a poetic affectation. When one says “I’m appearing on behalf of myself” it is usually with a note of sarcasm and elicits a chuckle because of course one is just “appearing”, not on behalf of someone by him or herself

He also ignores the fact that renewing a driver’s license is not discretionary as we discussed earlier.

But if those “examples” are troublesome his next few paragraphs are even more telling of his grasping at straws constructed of whole cloth, to combine two phrases.

He says:

The above detail is only to point out that most of us interpret the meaning of 20.02D to make it reasonable to us. I maintain that the board can also interpret the meaning of 20.02D in order to most closely find and identify conflicts of interest.


As we said before, there are separate sections dealing with real and direct conflicts. 20.02(D) is a prohibition on a list of prohibitions in order to avoid potential or perceived conflicts of interest

But next he makes the fatal error, that destroys any relevance of any of his arguments no matter how convoluted and contorted. He writes

If one looks at Code section 3-1.7 (c), (d), and (e), it is apparent that the County Council intended to interpret the meaning of 20.02D when it enacted the code.

Each section of the KCC section 3 notes the charter provision from which it is derived if indeed it is derived from the charter. But 3-1.7 only mentions section 20.01, not 20.02 much less 20.02(D)- which as we said before is not specifically mentioned in the ordinance- leaving the ordinance “silent” on the matter and so leaving the charter provision to stand as the only guide in the matter.

So with blatantly wrong premises in hand Hubbard attempts to list specific cases that could be rationalized using his irrational construct.

The part that stands out here is that if the "appear on behalf of a private interest” phrase is read with plain meaning, all of these “examples” provide areas where application is simple and direct. Only when pretzel logic and wordsmithing – along with a personal interest in making the provision meaningless- is used do they become cloudy.

After the driver’s licenses example Hubbard list others.

Here are some of the most contorted.

While I was on the salary commission and ethics board, I represented Grove Farm at the Real Property Division for agricultural dedications. Did I appear? Some say no since I did not go before a group. While I did not appear before the appeals board, would that have been any different than my dealings with the agency in getting agricultural dedications approved? Was there any conflict of interest?

As we said before he attempts to use the magician’s definition of “appear” rather than the lawyer’s.

While Allan Smith was a member of the Salary Commission, I am sure he appeared before the County Council, Planning Department, Public Works, Water Department and Planning Commission as a representative of Grove Farm. Is there any conflict here? This merits some discussion as the Salary Commission has no influence over any other board or commission, with whom Mr. Smith was also dealing.

As we said before, it doesn’t matter if it’s the same board. Hubbard again tries to conflate the conflict of interest provisions with the prohibitions which are based on potential for conflicts when even the ordinance does not list charter 20.02 as the basis for KCC 3-1.7.

Some planners in the Planning Department do drafting work as side employment. The department ethics rules, which the ethics board has approved, allows these planners to bring their work to the department for approval as long as they do not review their own work. They can also walk their plans through other departments with no restrictions (on their own time, of course). Is this appearing before an agency?

This is outrageous if it’s truly happening in our county- not that we doubt it does. People who work in the planning department should certainly not be allowed to seek outside employment where they come to their co-workers for approval of their projects. The prohibition of “work on their own plans” as the only violation is, in itself, a violation of all ethical principles that few if any can’t see is an unethical practice. The questions “what happens when you have to approve the plans of someone who just approved your plan” is almost to silly to have to ask.

Again it makes one ask if someone who can’t see this should even be on an ethics board much less the chair. As does the next one that says

Judy Lenthall appeared last year before the County Council representing the Food Bank. Is that a “private interest”? Did she appear as a board of ethics member?

Again it doesn’t matter if she is wearing a hat or any other finagling apparel . And of course the food bank is a private interest- for profit and not for profit isn’t a charter criteria and there are no “exceptions” for doing “good work”.

A planning commissioner is an architect who represents clients before various county agencies. The board of ethics opines that he cannot represent clients before the planning department, yet may do so before other departments in the county.

If they do they apparently have no basis for doing so.

But finally Hubbard comes upon one important exception- the first amendment "free speech" rights of an individual who seeks to speak in the “public” interest as one on a general law or measure before the county councilor planning commission.

In addition between not being able to distinguish between a private and a personal interest he has trouble with the difference between a private and a public interest

Next he says

A councilmember testifies in favor of a development project before the Planning Commission. Happens all the time. Is that “in behalf of”? A councilmember testifies against a development project before the Planning Commission. Happens all the time. Any difference? What about any employee or officer testifying in favor of a project before the Planning Commission? Don’t we all have the right of free speech and doesn’t the sunshine law to allow us to speak at a meeting? I believe yes and yes, but I must appear as an individual, not a board of ethics member.

Here there is that “public interest” component. What Hubbard attempts to do is to separate out the words “private” and “interest” and reconstruct them giving them a different reading. The word “interest” in the phrase “appear on behalf of a private interest” is one that denotes a direct or even indirect financial or otherwise tangible interest yet Hubbard again seeks to deconstruct and reconstruct in order to evade the plain meaning of the phrase.

In any case the first amendment trumps the county charter under supremacy principles and receives the highest protection from the courts whereas “private interests” do not.

Hubbard’s final evasion is to try to conflate 20.02(D) with 20.02(E) and claim they must be read together.

He writes

An objection by Horace Stoessel and others to the board’s opinions is that they feel my interpretation totally guts the intent of 20.02D and that there would be no examples of violation of 20.02D using my interpretation. I used some examples of an officer or employee using his official position to apply undue influence for a private interest. The objection to this was that section 20.02E covered that and so the meaning of 20.02D was being distorted by the board.


Let’s look at 20.02D and E.

20.02D – “No officer or employee of the county shall appear in behalf of private interests before any board, commission or agency.”

20.02E – “No officer or employee of the county shall use his official position to secure a special benefit, privilege or exemption for himself or others.”

Here he implies that only situations that violate the second provision also violate the first, which is simply not what the prohibition list in 20.02 says.

Finally he gives it his last and best misinterpretational effort concluding that somehow the person in question is “ok” as long as they claim they are not “wearing the hat” of the board they sit on based on his equivocal and out of context use of the word “appear”.

If I tried to put my interpretation of 20.02D into words, it would be “No officer or employee of the county shall appear in the capacity of his county position on behalf of private interests before any board, commission or agency. I think that is an appropriate use of the word “appear”. In the dictionary definition, examples given are that you appearing in court as the attorney, at the witness, or as the client. So, it is not just the individual appearing, but appearing in a certain capacity. I maintain this is a little different from 20.02E and use an example to demonstrate the difference.

Hubbard’s letter serves to show not just how his own personal prohibited actions drove his “logic” but how the appointing and approving authorities- the mayor and council- aren’t doing their due diligence in appointing people like him in the first place.

But he isn’t the only one.

At the same 4/08 meeting a memo- also reproduced in whole at the end of this piece and also typed out- from Lenthall was presented. It highlights how, in these people’s minds, it is possible to make these kinds of claims.

She apparently went back to the original charter commission- the one that wrote the charter in the 60’s.

She write to Hubbard

Hi Mark,

HOORAY! In fact, EUREKA! Mystery solved re. Intent of the Code of Ethics issue. Here’s the scoop:

In 1964, work first started on a Kaua`i Charter. A Charter Commission was established in 1965 and in 1966 they had a pretty solid draft that the Commission eventually approved. They seemed to have spent a lot of time trying to reinvent the wheel in 1965, but eventually they called upon the example charters from several mainland cities. The city that they eventually plagiarized the most was Salem, Oregon. And Salem Oregon has the same language that interests us.

Really that’s all you need to know if you read it carefully. But the original charter commission- made up of many attorneys who, like those today, “appeared on behalf of” all sorts of private interests but wanted to serve on the boards and commissions that approve their projects so they tried to insert all sorts of language that would allow them to do so.

She dug up some documents that indicate, not some kind of “original intent”- as she apparently would like to believe- but those thoughts rejected in favor of the ultimately voter-approved provisions.

These might have been some things that some wanted to include to allow their potential conflicts to stand as long as there was no quid pro quo apparent. But the important part is that they were not included in the charter, most likely not as some kind of oversight but for good reason..

She wrote

Since 1968, the language we currently see in our Code of Ethics (for those sections that interest us for the moment) has been identical. No changes. Thus, the intent of this language has to be found sometime in 1965-1966 (I’m assuming that this went to a public vote in 1967? I don’t know).

So, I got the minutes from their discussion about this and here it goes:

1964

Code of Ethics DRAFT PROPOSAL (NOTE: This is a typed sheet with lots of internal corrections and hand-written notes on it). This is NOT the Charter Commission people’s work yet, but elected leaders?)

1. Nothing contained herein shall preclude the acceptance of contributions for election campaigns.
2. Full disclosure in writing to appointing authority or council, to be of public record, of such interests, at any time that such conflict becomes apparent.
3. No outside employment, business or professional activity which may impair his independence of judgment in exercise of official duties, or might induce him to disclose confidential information, or which is otherwise inconsistent or incompatible with or which interferes with the proper discharge of official duties.
4. Council to disclose interest in writing prior to vote.

Lenthall also seems to rely on the ordinance that as we said is actually silent as to the 20.02 prohibitions and then tries to divine some kind of “intent” from the proposed provisions even though. as she notes, they were rejected.

She goes on to say

So, the above was the original start of this issue. This draft was sent to the newly formed Charter Commission who promptly rejected it (and a LOT more), The Charter Commission apparently felt that THEY were supposed to be the crafters of this document. The first Charter Commission in Kaua`i discussed the code of ethics stuff at their April 19th and April 26, 1966 meetings, and they flushed out the section we’re interested in.

Though she’s not clear about who “they” are it’s presumably the council although the words “code of ethics” refer to both KCC section 3- passed by the council after the charter- and the charter section 20 itself.

She then apparently cites some other proposed but rejected language to show it should have been included or indicates some kind of intent, even though it also was never included.

April 19, 1966 info:

I need to scan and attach this whole page because it’s too much to write. Briefly, it says if you get PAID in whole or part by the County, (NOTE: This would exclude Board volunteers!), you can’t represent private interests before any agency. Then it says:

This section shall not be construed:

to prohibit any officer or employee from being affiliated with, employed by or representing a person, firm or corporation whose direct and indirect interest in business dealings with the county forms an insubstantial part of its total business, provided that he has not been retained for the purpose of appearing before the whole agency, and provided further that the compensation in whole or in part is not contingent or dependent upon action by such agency.
to prohibit any officer or employee from appearing before any agency upon matters only incidentally part of the employment provided that he has not been retained for the purpose of appearing before the agency, and provided further that the compensation in whole or in part is not contingent or dependent upon action by such agency;

Her interpretation again indicates how her compromised position has compromised any objectivity in the matter, further writing

The jist (sic) of the above is that I think they were trying to REALLY define stuff to be important and payment can’t be contingent on the action of the agency...
.
To me, the intent of the original crafters (1964) was a) disclose; b) don’t mess with anything that could impair your independent judgment. I’ll buy BOTH of those intents. The 2nd version again tries to a) disclose; and b) establish an importance factor to the matter; but muddies the waters with the WHOLE AGENCY language. What? It’s OK to meet before PART of the agency?

Unfortunately, ALL this deliberation got reduced to the VERY simplistic phrase, “Thou shalt not appear before any agency” because this was the copied language from Salem, Oregon. this was the language that was eventually approved for the County’s FIRST charter, and the language which has remained ever since 1968.

But the point is, I think I’m clear now in the intent, and I think it makes sense.

It might “make sense” if you are trying to construct some rationale for violating the plain reading of a law of which you are in violation.

It might “make sense” if you forget about the fact that they apparently rejected the provisions because they were simply so unethical that they thought they’d better go to a generally accepted standard of ethics rather than insert one cooked up in a paternalistic backroom by representatives of plantations seeking to implement watered down ethics laws and allow themselves carte blanche to concoct public policy to their own benefit.

But if all that isn’t troublesome enough, the fact that she is in a compromised position has clouded her judgment even on such issues as stealing from the county.

She finally says

Alas, there is NOTHING on “don’t use county property for personal use” because that too appears to be a copied section with ABSOLUTELY no wiggle-room. Seems to me that if we use the original crafters logic, a level of importance or value might be tried to using county property for person use, before we get every mislaid paper clip, phone call, vehicle person errand, etc. before the Board of Ethics.

The much abused “paper clip” example has been used by thieves to discredit the law since paper clips were introduced to offices.

It all points to the self-distorted mindset of the Kaua`i Board of Ethics that attempts to reduce all ethical provisions- except for direct self-dealing transaction and observable quid pro quos- to absurdity through disingenuous self-serving, out-of-context word manipulation and faulty logic, combined with an intentional misreading and just plain untrue claims.

Many see this debacle as a reason for re-writing the ethics provisions in the charter and county code. But other than amending the county code to reiterate the charter provisions there is little that needs clarifying to those who approach the issues raised before the BOE with a clear mind and without being in violations of those provisions they are sworn to uphold.

But it is hard to really blame the appointed individuals and hold them wholly responsible. If the county council and the mayor had bothered to read the laws they were sworn to uphold, they wouldn’t be appointing those few in the community who routinely appear on behalf of private interest before agencies, board and commissions to those very board and commissions, especially the one that determines complicity with the law.

Like Caesar’s wife the BOE members should be beyond reproach, and certainly not guilty of the laws they are supposed to uphold.

But there may be one provision that needs to be enacted. At present, according to county and state law the place to file a complaint would be... yes, the Kaua`i Board of Ethics.

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Mark Hubbard’s Perspective of Kauai County Charter Section 20.02D (in full)

The issue of Charter Section 20.02D has been bothering me for about a year now and I wish to give you some history and mostly my rationale for my current personal position on the interpretation of section 20.02 D. The below views and statements are mine personally and are not to be attributed to the Board of Ethics or any other member of that board.

When the board discussed Dee Crowell’s request for an advisory opinion in late 2007, I do not remember any discussion of how 20.02D might impact the opinion. I only remember referencing the County Code, section 3-1.7{d}. The board concluded that a Board of Water Commission appointee is not precluded from acting in a representative capacity before other County agencies and departments as long as he complied with code section 3-1.7.

In early 2008, the issue of section 20.02 came up in regard to Jonathan Chun’s request for an advisory opinion regarding his representing clients before various County agencies and departments. Several members of the public, including Horace Stoessel, maintained private interests before any board, commission or agency. I saw 20.02D for the first time in the light of its plain language and was shocked to realize that I had been on the Ethics board for several years (I have served at least one term prior to my current term without being aware of this issue. I guess it should not be surprising as I believe that this issue has been seldom if ever raised in the 40+ years of the Charter’s existence.

Another reason for my being bothered by this language is that I like to be exact, specific, rational and literal. I talked with Horace Stoessel who I had previously served with on the Salary Commission and for whom I have considerable respect. I also talked with a former Ethics board member who said it could simply be interpreted to mean that no employee or officer could appear “wearing the hat of their office: in behalf of private interests before any agency, board or commission. This sounded reasonable to me as a way of fitting the board’s opinion regarding Dee Crowell and many other examples in apparent conflict with a plain language interpretation of 20.02D. Yet, Horace and others felt that the broad has no authority to “narrow: the language of 20.02D, as it is the Charter and the voice of the people. The board ended up saying that Jonathan Chun could in fact represent private interests in front of boards and commissions other than the Charter Review Commission, of which he was a member.

The controversy is still around as evidenced by Horace’s email. What continues to concern me is how am I able to reconcile a myriad of situations which can be seen to conflict with a plain language interpretation of 20.02D.

It is my current belief that the board has the right to interpret 20.02D. This is based on my observation that everyone who has opposed the board’s opinions in this matter (with possible exception of Bruce Pleas) has in fact interpreted 20.02D in their own way (as I will indicate below).

Let us look specifically at the language and some examples. The language says that “no officer or employee of the county shall appear in behalf of private interests before any board, commission or agency.”

- “Officer or employee” covers all county employees, elected officials, appointees and board and commission members. No one seems to have different interpretations of this term.


- The word “appear”, particularly when used with the word “before” means “to come formally before an authoritative body”. Another definition is to “come into view, become visible”. Here there are different interpretations. Many would say that getting one’s driver’s license is not “appearing” before the Finance Department. I won’t disagree.

- The word “behalf”, often used as “in behalf of” or “on behalf of”, can mean in support of, in the interest of, for the benefit of, as a representative of, in defense of. It is my belief, in hearing testimony by Walter Lewis and Horace Stoessel, that they believe that the primary meaning and possibly the only relevant meaning in the context of 20.02D is “as a representative of”. again, I maintain that there are different interpretations here.

- “Private interests”, by dictionary definition, means “intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, group or class”. Yet, I heard Walter Lewis state in his testimony that he felt that the meaning in 20.02D did not include “personal interest” but only the interest of another person or entity. That jives with the above interpretation of behalf = represent. Here again, we have different interpretations.

- “board, commission or agency” means, by Charter definition, “any office, department, board, commission or other governmental unit of the county”. This would include the County Council. I have seen no disagreement on this interpretation to date.

The above detail is only to point out that most of us interpret the meaning of 20.02D to make it reasonable to us. I maintain that the board can also interpret the meaning of 20.02D in order to most closely find and identify conflicts of interest.

If one looks at Code section 3-1.7 (c), (d), and (e), it is apparent that the County Council intended to interpret the meaning of 20.02D when it enacted the code.

Let’s look at several examples of how a broad interpretation of 20.02D can affect many actions that have occurred in the past and are occurring today, without any claim of conflict of interest or ethical misconduct. While I mention individual names and companies in the some cases, it is only that I know of these and to give a clear example, yet I am sure that there are a myriad of other similar examples that I do not know personally about.

- I go to the Finance Dept to renew my driver’s license. Am I appearing before them? Is it a private interest?

- While I was on the salary commission and ethics board, I represented Grove Farm at the Real Property Division for agricultural dedications. Did I appear? Some say no since I did not go before a group. While I did not appear before the appeals board, would that have been any different than my dealings with the agency in getting agricultural dedications approved? Was there any conflict of interest?

- While Allan Smith was a member of the Salary Commission, I am sure he appeared before the County Council, Planning Department, Public Works, Water Department and Planning Commission as a representative of Grove Farm. Is there any conflict here? This merits some discussion as the Salary Commission has no influence over any other board or commission, with whom Mr. Smith was also dealing.

- Councilmember Mel Rapozo appeared before the Ethics board to seek an opinion about his company’s successful bid to deliver subpoenas for the County. Of note is that he stated that he was appearing not as a councilmember, but as the owner of his business. This was at the same meeting when members of the public were objecting to Jonathan Chun’s representing clients in front of other commissions. At the same Ethics board meeting, Councilmember Shaylene Iseri-Carvalho spoke in favor of Mel’s company contract. When I asked if any of them thought that Mel or Shaylene’s appearance before us violated 20.02D, no one spoke up. In fact several said it was appropriate. This still bothers me as I see no difference between the actions of Jonathan and the actions of Mel and Shaylene when it comes to section 20.02D.

- Some planners in the Planning Department do drafting work as side employment. The department ethics rules, which the ethics board has approved, allows these planners to bring their work to the department for approval as long as they do not review their own work. They can also walk their plans through other departments with no restrictions (on their own time, of course). Is this appearing before an agency?

- Judy Lenthall appeared last year before the County Council representing the Food Bank. Is that a “private interest”? Did she appear as a board of ethics member?

- Any officer or employee goes before the Planning Commission for a permit for his own property. This happens on a regular basis. Is this “in behalf of private interests”? More often, they go to the Planning Department and Public Works Department for building permits. Many times, they will walk the permits through. I have done that. Is this “appearing before”?

- A planning commissioner is an architect who represents clients before various county agencies. The board of ethics opines that he cannot represent clients before the planning department, yet may do so before other departments in the county.

- A County solid waste worker wants to bid on a competitive proposal by the county within his own department. He comes before the Ethics board to ask for an opinion. Is he appearing in behalf of private interests?

- A councilmember testifies in favor of a development project before the Planning Commission. Happens all the time. Is that “in behalf of”? A councilmember testifies against a development project before the Planning Commission. Happens all the time. Any difference? What about any employee or officer testifying in favor of a project before the Planning Commission? Don’t we all have the right of free speech and doesn’t the sunshine law to allow us to speak at a meeting? I believe yes and yes, but I must appear as an individual, not a board of ethics member. I believe there is a difference. Jonathan Chun is on the Charter Review Commission. He represents clients in front of the Planning Commission and County Council. Is there a conflict of interest?

I hope you can imagine that there are many more examples. I see no conflict of interest or inherent violation of ethical conduct in any of the above examples.

Judy Lenthall did some research into the history of the language of 20.02 and the intent behind 20.02D. I attach her email for your interest. While her research gives an indication of the intent of the charter language, I will never be sure of the intent since it was done in the mid-sixties and I was not there. I do have one indication of the intent and that is section 20.04 (Disclosure) which states that included in the disclosure must be “the names of persons represented before government agencies”. Why would this disclosure be required if one was prohibited from representing private interests?

An objection by Horace Stoessel and others to the board’s opinions is that they feel my interpretation totally guts the intent of 20.02D and that there would be no examples of violation of 20.02D using my interpretation. I used some examples of an officer or employee using his official position to apply undue influence for a private interest. The objection to this was that section 20.02E covered that and so the meaning of 20.02D was being distorted by the board.

Let’s look at 20.02D and E.
20.02D – “No officer or employee of the county shall appear in behalf of private interests before any board, commission or agency.”
20.02E – “No officer or employee of the county shall use his official position to secure a special benefit, privilege or exemption for himself or others.”
If I tried to put my interpretation of 20.02D into words, it would be “No officer or employee of the county shall appear in the capacity of his county position on behalf of private interests before any board, commission or agency. I think that is an appropriate use of the word “appear”. In the dictionary definition, examples given are that you appearing in court as the attorney, at the witness, or as the client. So, it is not just the individual appearing, but appearing in a certain capacity. I maintain this is a little different from 20.02E and use an example to demonstrate the difference.

- The mayor goes to the building department and asks the department to issue his friend a pending permit right away. In my opinion, this would be undue influence and a violation of ethics and 20.02D. It might not be a violation of 20.02E as a permit being issued is not necessarily a special benefit, privilege or exemption.

As a final bit of information, I looked through all the board of ethics opinions since 1976. I only found 5 that related to appearing before boards, commissions or agencies. Two opinions, in 1999 and 2005, stated that an officer or employee could testify or appear before boards commissions or agencies in a personal capacity, but no in their county capacity. Three opinions, two in 2007 and one in 2008, allowed board or commission members to represent private interests before boards, commissions and agencies other than their own. These last three opinions, by the way, were made by the same board of ethics, which included myself, Judy Lenthall, Leila Fuller and Bob Farias.

I agree with Horace that the County’s Guide to Ethical Issues has an example which can be considered contrary to the Jonathan Chun and Dee Crowell opinions. I suggest a remedy that I am sure Horace would object to and that is to delete this example from the handbook. We can in the near future review the entire handbook and may be able to address section 20.02D in a clear manner. Yet, we should delete the example of page 7 now,

Sincerely,
Mark Hubbard
2-23-09
Attachment: email from Judy Lenthall dated 5-14-08

_______________

Judith Lenthall memo (in full)

Hi Mark,

HOORAY! In fact, EUREKA! Mystery solved re. Intent of the Code of Ethics issue. Here’s the scoop:

In 1964, work first started on a Kaua`i Charter. A Charter Commission was established in 1965 and in 1966 they had a pretty solid draft that the Commission eventually approved. They seemed to have spent a lot of time trying to reinvent the wheel in 1965, but eventually they called upon the example charters from several mainland cities. The city that they eventually plagiarized the most was Salem, Oregon. And Salem Oregon has the same language that interests us.

Since 1968, the language we currently see in our Code of Ethics (for those sections that interest us for the moment) has been identical. No changes. Thus, the intent of this language has to be found sometime in 1965-1966 (I’m assuming that this went to a public vote in 1967? I don’t know).

So, I got the minutes from their discussion about this and here it goes:

1964

Code of Ethics DRAFT PROPOSAL (NOTE: This is a typed sheet with lots of internal corrections and hand-written notes on it). This is NOT the Charter Commission people’s work yet, but elected leaders?)

5. Nothing contained herein shall preclude the acceptance of contributions for election campaigns.
6. Full disclosure in writing to appointing authority or council, to be of public record, of such interests, at any time that such conflict becomes apparent.
7. No outside employment, business or professional activity which may impair his independence of judgment in exercise of official duties, or might induce him to disclose confidential information, or which is otherwise inconsistent or incompatible with or which interferes with the proper discharge of official duties.
8. Council to disclose interest in writing prior to vote.

So, the above was the original start of this issue. This draft was sent to the newly formed Charter Commission who promptly rejected it (and a LOT more), The Charter Commission apparently felt that THEY were supposed to be the crafters of this document. The first Charter Commission in Kaua`i discussed the code of ethics stuff at their April 19th and April 26, 1966 meetings, and they flushed out the section we’re interested in.

April 19, 1966 info:

I need to scan and attach this whole page because it’s too much to write. Briefly, it says if you get PAID in whole or part by the County, (NOTE: This would exclude Board volunteers!), you can’t represent private interests before any agency. Then it says:

This section shall not be construed:

to prohibit any officer or employee from being affiliated with, employed by or representing a person, firm or corporation whose direct and indirect interest in business dealings with the county forms an insubstantial part of its total business, provided that he has not been retained for the purpose of appearing before the whole agency, and provided further that the compensation in whole or in part is not contingent or dependent upon action by such agency.
to prohibit any officer or employee from appearing before any agency upon matters only incidentally part of the employment provided that he has not been retained for the purpose of appearing before the agency, and provided further that the compensation in whole or in part is not contingent or dependent upon action by such agency;

The jist (sic) of the above is that I think they were trying to REALLY define stuff to be important and payment can’t be contingent on the action of the agency. What is a little confusing is the “you can’t be retained to appear before the whole agency.” What do you think that means?

To me, the intent of the original crafters (1964) was a) disclose; b) don’t mess with anything that could impair your independent judgment. I’ll buy BOTH of those intents. The 2nd version again tries to a) disclose; and b) establish an importance factor to the matter; but muddies the waters with the WHOLE AGENCY language. What? It’s OK to meet before PART of the agency?

Unfortunately, ALL this deliberation got reduced to the VERY simplistic phrase, “Thou shalt not appear before any agency” because this was the copied language from Salem, Oregon. this was the language that was eventually approved for the County’s FIRST charter, and the language which has remained ever since 1968.


But the point is, I think I’m clear now in the intent, and I think it makes sense.

Alas, there is NOTHING on “don’t use county property for personal use” because that too appears to be a copied section with ABSOLUTELY no wiggle-room. Seems to me that if we use the original crafters logic, a level of importance or value might be tried to using county property for person use, before we get every mislaid paper clip, phone call, vehicle person errand, etc. before the Board of Ethics.

So the question I have now is what do I do with this info? Turn it over to Barbara? Can I give it to the guy that seems to have the biggest beef about this language? What?

In any even, I am finally satisfied about the intent and if given this information BEFORE, I would NOT have abstained from my vote.

IMUA!

Aloha,

Judy

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